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LAW WITHOUT ABSOLUTES: TOWARD A 
PRAGMATIC SCIENCE OF LAW 
JD HSIN

 
ABSTRACT 
Although today the very idea of a science of law—the thought that law 
could be made a science like any other taught and studied at a modern 
university—has the ring of an oxymoron, this piece argues that the 
rejection of legal science was not only overhasty but unnecessary. There is 
a sense in which we can see law as a science, it argues, but only once we 
come to see more clearly and accurately just why the tradition of legal 
science begun in the earliest days of the Western legal tradition and 
brought to America by Christopher Columbus Langdell was destined to 
fail. The article accordingly lays out a reconstruction of both the basic 
idea of legal science and the specific conception that Langdell was 
effectively working out in the context of the American common law: the 
rationalist tradition of legal science. It contends that what was distinctive 
of the tradition was the absolutist way it had understood and framed the 
intellectual core of the law: its absolutism as to the law’s content, method, 
and viewpoint. After tracing that tradition from its twelfth-century origins 
through Langdell’s modern reinterpretation, the article goes on to 
examine the twofold critique of that science conceptualized by Holmes and 
later carried out in detail by the American Legal Realists, showing that, 
contrary to the claims of a rationalist legal science, the law is 
indeterminate not just in practice but in principle. Understanding this 
principled indeterminacy thus sets the stage for reconsideration of the 
failure of rationalist legal science, pioneered by the early fellow-traveler 
of the Realists, John Dewey—a pragmatic science of law, freed of 
absolutes.   
 
 
   The author, a recent graduate of Harvard Law School, is currently a doctoral candidate in 
philosophy at Johns Hopkins University.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
220 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 9:219 
 
 
 
 
. . . the lawless science of our law,  
That codeless myriad of precedent,  
That wilderness of single instances,  
Thro’ which a few, by wit or fortune led,  
May beat a pathway out to wealth and fame.
1
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INTRODUCTION 
Today the very idea of a science of law—the thought that law could be 
made a science like any other taught and studied at a modern university—
has the ring of an oxymoron, the punch line of a forgotten joke. Ever since 
Oliver Wendell Holmes challenged the first dean of the Harvard Law 
School a century or so ago for peddling a “legal theology” in his first 
casebook,
2
 itself a first try at legal science in America,
3
 the idea has 
received near universal condemnation.
4
 Although critics are divided over 
exactly where and why a thinker like Langdell got things so badly wrong, 
there is little question today that he did.
5
 Misled about how lawyers and 
judges really think when thinking about law, the criticism goes, Langdell 
inevitably misunderstood what it is that lawyers think about. Lawyers no 
more resolve disputes with deductions from “a few fundamental 
doctrines”6 than car mechanics fix sputtering engines with calculations 
from the laws of motion or electro-magnetism. Failing to see what lawyers 
actually do when ‘doing’ law, the professor let himself slip into the grip of 
a picture that was altogether too tidy and so, naturally, false. Just where 
law is to go from these purely negative observations has eluded the same 
consensus, with some thinking it should be reworked essentially from the 
outside, in the image of the “real” sciences of economics or sociology,7 
while others would demote it to paid partisanship, the lucrative business of 
getting clients out of court and on the right side of the powers-that-be.
8
 No 
 
 
 2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Notices, 14. AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880). 
 3. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, CASES ON CONTRACTS i (1871). 
 4. A recent exception is Nancy Cook’s attempt at rescuing the “paradigm” of legal science 
through an analogy with twentieth-century philosophy of science. See Nancy Cook, Law as Science: 
Revisiting Langdell’s Paradigm in the 21st Century, 88 N. D. L. REV. 21 (2012). Her emphasis falls, 
only naturally given that aim, on drawing out the points of similarity between the two. Here, by 
contrast, I aim to make a direct case for a science of law, by fleshing out the wider sense of ‘science’ 
that inspired lawyers like Langdell to think of their work as scientific.  
 5. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND 
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886–1937 5 (1998) (describing the idea of a legal science as “fatuous”). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed., 2014); Roger Cotterrell, 
Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically?, 25 J.L. & SOC’Y 171 (1998). See also Anthony 
Townsend Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 337–39 
(1988) (discussing the ways that Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies have sought to study 
the law from outside the discipline). 
 8. See Kronman, supra note 7, at 338–39 (discussing the “conventionalist” response to Legal 
Realism); Brian Bix, Law as an Autonomous Discipline, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 975 (Peter Crane & Mark Tushnet eds. 2003) (arguing that the law’s relative autonomy is due 
to the distinctive skills lawyers learn as participants in a hierarchically rule-governed and precedent-
bound system). 
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matter the resolution of those debates, however, the contemporary 
consensus is now quite clear: whatever law is, it is not a science.  
This Article argues that this consensus is mistaken, and importantly so. 
Not only does this blank rejection of legal science rest on an overly crude, 
indeed at times false, understanding of the tradition of legal science that 
began long before Langdell thought to make it a theme of his casebook 
and classroom. It also fails to reckon seriously, if at all, with the 
possibility that there is something intellectually distinctive to law: that 
there is more than a codeless myriad of past decisions to guide decisions 
today, and that through its vast wilderness one can cut paths other than 
those leading to the glory of a headline, or a good living. Just as 
importantly, though, this overhasty dismissal of legal science has thrown 
the law into a genuinely practical predicament—the near constant feeling 
of professional crisis that has come with the hollowing out of its 
intellectual identity, the loss of its fighting faith.
9
 It was no accident, after 
all, that Langdell first sketched his idea of a legal science in the preface to 
a casebook, or infamously opened his first class at Harvard, not with the 
then-customary lecture, but by asking one Mr. Fox for the facts of Payne 
v. Cave.
10
 Indeed, the pedagogical pillars on which the modern profession 
now stands—the three-year post-baccalaureate degree; the lecture-hall 
drama of the “Socratic” interrogation; the bread-and-butter genres of 
modern legal literature, the casebook and law review; even final exams—
all were quarried from an idea that is now thought worse than quaint, even 
faintly ridiculous: the idea that law could be a science, and the library its 
laboratory.
11
 Having forgotten if not forsaken its scientific past, law now 
finds itself at a loss to explain its place alongside the disciplines of a 
modern university—its status as a genuinely learned profession. Law, no 
longer a science, has not only lost its intellectual focus, but its very point 
of view.  
 
 
 9. See generally Larry Alexander, What We Do, and Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1885 
(1993) (remarking the “identity crisis” facing the “lawyer-teacher” arising from the uncertainty about 
law’s “integrity and autonomy as an institution”); Jack Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 964–70 (1996) (noting the sense of crisis in the law and its relation to the 
encroachment of disciplinary outsiders); HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION 
OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 33–41 (1983) (discussing the crisis in which the Western legal 
tradition found itself at the close of the twentieth-century, linked to a decline in a viable legal science); 
Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s 
‘Consideration and Form’, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 97–98 (2000) (indicating the declining faith of the 
“American legal consciousness” in its own rationality).  
 10. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
 11. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Address at Harvard University “Quarter-Millennial” 
Celebration (Nov. 5, 1886), 3 L.Q. Rev. 123, 123–24 (1887); WIECEK, supra note 5, at 93. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/6
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This Article argues that this rejection of legal science, giving rise today 
to so much professional and intellectual doubt, was altogether needless—a 
self-inflicted jurisprudential wound. There is, in fact, a sense in which we 
can see law as a science, but only once we see more clearly and accurately 
just why Langdell’s science was destined to fail: what about his legal 
science was so clearly wrong. Part I accordingly lays out both the basic 
idea of legal science and specific conception that Langdell was working 
out in the context of the American common law: the rationalist tradition 
of legal science. What was distinctive of that tradition was the absolutist 
way it had understood and framed the intellectual character of legal 
science: an absolutism as to the law’s content, method, and viewpoint. Part 
II then reviews and examines the twofold critique of that science begun by 
Holmes and later carried out in detail by the American Legal Realists, 
showing that, contrary to the claims of a rationalist legal science, the law 
is indeterminate not just in practice but in principle. Hardly a decisive 
objection to a science of law as such, this principled indeterminacy instead 
sets the stage for a fresh reconsideration of the failure of rationalist legal 
science, one already pioneered by the early fellow-traveler of the Legal 
Realists, John Dewey. What Dewey sought was a naturalized 
understanding of the intellectual premises of the law and, through those 
efforts, a naturalized theory of legal science—a science of law without 
absolutes. By taking up the naturalism of Holmes, and absorbing the 
critical lessons of the later Realists, Dewey sought a legal science that 
would synthesize the law’s distinctive body of concepts and principles in a 
way that would be useful to the working lawyer yet capable of the growth 
that was largely lacking in the rationalist tradition of legal science. What 
he argued for, and what we need now more than ever, is a pragmatic 
science of law—the first article of a new fighting faith for our law. 
I. ABSOLUTIZING THE LAW: THE RATIONALIST IDEA AND IDEAL OF LEGAL 
SCIENCE 
 The idea and ideal of legal science that Justice Holmes had ridiculed 
was already quite old by the time it swept across the American legal scene 
in the dawn of the last century—a century that would see more than one 
attempt at burying it for good. Indeed, the roots of that legal science, 
lightly sketched in the first pages of the first modern casebook, reached 
well beyond the traditional materials of English theory and experience on 
which American lawyers like Langdell ordinarily drew, and into the very 
earliest years and oldest sources of Western legal thought. And like those 
ancestral notions of legal science, the ideal of a legal science that briefly 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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flourished among American legal thinkers
12
 was a vision of absolutes—of 
law as a system of principles that was practically and intellectually 
autonomous from any other discipline or field of study. It was this vision 
that the Realists all rejected in one way or another, and which therefore 
deserves in this section a somewhat more synoptic depiction than it has 
usually received.  
Before turning to that depiction, however, it is worth noting that the 
tradition of legal science I outline here is necessarily a simplification, an 
abstraction away from the actual historical systems and thinkers discussed. 
What has gone by the name of legal science has differed greatly from one 
legal thinker, system, and age to the next. Thus, an idealization like the 
one I pursue here will of course have to rub away important qualifications 
and complications. Only complicating matters is the fact that the thinkers 
who articulated the elements of a theory of legal science, Langdell among 
them, were lawyers and jurists, not philosophers.
13
 Perhaps 
understandably, then, they often displayed little inclination to spell out 
their analytical assumptions and prepossessions. In what follows I will 
therefore be aiming less for the faithful biography of the idea of a science 
of law and more for its philosophical reconstruction, along lines that will 
be somewhat artificial as a result. This will nevertheless help to lay out 
more clearly what a legal science has generally been thought to entail—
what the idea of a legal science comes to both generically and under the 
more specific, traditional interpretation that links a relatively modern 
lawyer like Langdell to the medieval jurists and canonists who helped 
found our broader Western legal tradition. As we will see, what that 
traditional science has been thought to involve are three closely-connected 
assumptions about the intellectual character and premise of the law—what 
it consists of, and how we come to know, justify and use it—all of which 
were drawn in a spirit of absolutes.   
 
 
 12. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 478 (3d ed., 2005) (noting 
that towards the end of the nineteenth century the “dominant culture of legal scholarship was infected 
by Langdell’s ideas of legal science, or converged on the same state”). There is of course not universal 
agreement that this highly formalistic and conceptualist mode of thinking ever achieved anything like 
the status of an orthodoxy in that period, although the evidence against it has been less than persuasive. 
See BRIAN TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE REALIST-FORMALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN 
JUDGING (2010) (disputing the prevalence of Langdell’s type of “formalism” in the same period); 
Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue? 16 LEGAL THEORY 111 (2010) 
(questioning the cogency of Tamanaha’s historical argument on this point). 
 13. See WIECEK, supra note 5, at 80 (noting that, “like American lawyers of any period,” legal 
thinkers in late nineteenth-century America were “notoriously indifferent to philosophical inquiry”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/6
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A. The Assumptions of Traditional Legal Science 
When Langdell declared at a meeting of the Harvard Law School 
Association that “law is a science,” and that “all the available materials of 
that science are contained in printed books,”14 his audience of lawyers 
likely sensed nothing especially revolutionary in the air. Nor did they 
likely catch the echoes of the Scholastic Jurists who had expressed much 
the same conviction several hundred years before. After all, what Langdell 
appeared to be saying in calling law a “science” was simply that it was 
more than mere handicraft. Law, regarded as a science, was also an 
authentically intellectual discipline, aimed at elaborating and 
systematizing a body of general propositions or “truths” of law, and which 
therefore needed the prop of an intellectual culture that valued impartial 
inquiry and institutions willing to support it.
15
 This was hardly startling 
stuff, at least not to a generation of lawyers raised on systematic treatises 
like Parson’s Contracts or Greenleaf’s Evidence, or to the fairly 
uncommon lawyer in those early days who had picked up his doctrinal 
basics at a law school like Harvard’s.16 In this wider sense, Langdell’s 
science was less a philosophical surmise than a sociological banality—
plain fact. 
Yet, at a closer look, these bland appearances gave way to a more 
radical thought. For what Langdell had understood as the intellectual 
substance of this science—the truths that he believed he was uncovering as 
a legal scientist—and how he thought they related to the prosaic materials 
of legal life, had amounted to something genuinely new in America, and 
represented a considerable narrowing of the notion of legal science from 
its wider sense. It was in fact only the modern flowering of what I will call 
the tradition of rationalist legal science.
17
 The fact that Langdell’s was 
 
 
 14. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Address at Harvard University “Quarter-Millennial” 
Celebration (Nov. 5, 1886), 3 L.Q. Rev. 123, 123–24 (1887). 
 15. These correspond to the premises that Harold Berman has identified as the founding 
assumptions of the scientific strain in the Western legal tradition, what he calls its methodological, 
value, and sociological premises. See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Western Legal Science, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 894, 930–941 (1977); see also Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: 
The Model of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 421 (1999) (discussing the background of early “moral” and later “naturalistic” legal sciences in 
nineteenth-century American law schools).  
 16. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 467–77 (reviewing the history of Harvard Law School’s 
curricular transformation under Langdell and the treatises popular with lawyers in the nineteenth 
century); see also WIECEK, supra note 5, at 38–41 (discussing the early examples of legal science in 
19th century American law).  
 17. By calling this science “rationalist” I do not mean to imply any particular affinity between 
the view I am attributing to Langdell and the twelfth-century jurists and the various philosophies that 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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only a modern variant of a much older and more general theory of legal 
science (and a rationalist one at that) can be seen in the way that he 
elaborated the three assumptions on which it rested—assumptions relating 
to the law’s content, to its methodology, and to its viewpoint. These 
assumptions, held and explored long before Langdell came to apply them 
to American common law, naturally gave rise to differences between these 
theoretical variants. Some of the differences, as we will see, are quite 
substantial. But these were differences lying mostly on the surface, 
ultimately owing more to the vastly different social and intellectual 
milieus in which they were conceived—late nineteenth-century America 
as opposed to twelfth-century Europe—than to the theory that their 
common assumptions defined. Understanding how those assumptions 
were worked out in these differing contexts, and especially in the modern 
and medieval contexts where they achieved their widest influence, will 
help us to see just what their common theory of legal science really came 
to, and why, in Realist hands, it was sure to unravel.  
1. The Content Assumption: Content Absolutism 
The two attributes most clearly—and invidiously—associated today 
with the leading historical examples of legal science are ones that their 
champions only rarely addressed directly, and never in so many words. 
These are what have since become known as their conceptualism and 
formalism, and both lie at the heart of the rationalism typical of their 
common intellectual tradition. Just as important as each of these attributes, 
though, was an assumption implicit in both, and especially when taken 
together—the assumption that law comprises a set of universal or absolute 
legal principles of concepts, comprehensive in scope and complete and 
consistent in its answers to legal questions. It was a picture of law 
sketched from a vision of conceptual absolutes. Explaining how that 
absolutism has historically appeared and what more it entails will first 
require some discussion of the twin attributes associated with the legal 
science typifying it—its conceptualism and formalism.  
In the case of modern legal science, both attributes made an early, if 
oblique appearance in one of the few places that Langdell ever spoke of a 
 
 
have since gone by the same name. I am instead following the usage that the philosopher Ronald Giere 
has suggested for characterizing the logical positivists’ philosophy of science, an “enlightenment 
rationalism.” See RONALD GIERE, SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS 57–65 (1999). Nor am I the first to use the 
term in characterizing Langdell’s legal science. See Morris Cohen, Law and Scientific Method, 6 AM. 
L. SCH. REV. 231, 234 (1927) (observing that Langdell “labored under a thoroughly rationalistic 
conception” of law).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/6
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science of law at all:
18
 in the preface to his first casebook on Contracts. 
There, he introduced this effectively new genre of legal literature with 
typical matter-of-factness: 
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles and 
doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be to apply them 
with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of 
human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer . . . Each of these 
doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees; in other 
words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through centuries. 
This growth is to be trace in the main through a series of cases . . . 
Moreover the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less 
than is commonly supposed; the many different guises in which the 
same doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the great 
extent to which legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being 
the cause of much misapprehension. If these doctrines could be so 
classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper 
place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable from 
their number.
19
 
Beyond the obvious longing for simplicity and conceptual tidiness is also a 
theoretical impulse, found where the first and last sentences meet—the 
point at which his conceptualism emerges. This view holds that law not 
only consists of certain legal rules, principles, and concepts, together 
forming what lawyers broadly call “doctrine.” It also consists of these 
doctrinal “threads” in a certain orderly, systematically-interconnected way: 
they were thought to run throughout different patches of the common law, 
invisibly pulling together and binding the rules scattered across the case 
reporters into a single conceptual garment. These doctrinal threads were 
accordingly few in number—they collected together many rules, even 
some that might not have appeared to go together—and were wider in 
reach than ordinary, case-specific rules of law.
20
 All the legal scientist 
need do was uncover these threads.  
 
 
 18. Bruce Kimball has noted in his enlightening intellectual biography of Langdell that, in all of 
the ten-thousand-odd pages he wrote, Langdell explicitly drew an analogy between law and natural 
science only three times—the most widely remembered being the one reproduced above. Kimball 
therefore doubts both the centrality, even the sincerity, of that analogy in Langdell’s understanding of 
law. Suffice it to say that I disagree with his assessment, and, bowing to received tradition, will pursue 
the analogy as a live one. See BRUCE KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL 
EDUCATION: C.C. LANGDELL, 1826-1906 349–51 (2009). 
 19. LANGDELL, supra note 3. 
 20. The concepts relevant to this ordering are those, as Thomas Grey has pointed out, that 
lawyers would consider issue-determinative: concepts like ‘adverse possession’ or ‘collateral estoppel 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This thought alone, of course, was hardly enough to distinguish a 
unique legal theory, let alone a legal science. Nobody could seriously have 
denied, after all, that notions like ‘negligence’ or ‘causation’ spanned law 
in a way that lifted them in a sense out of and above a narrow line of cases. 
What was distinctive about Langdell’s thinking on this point—the 
conceptualism behind his thought—was his belief that the entirety of the 
common law was amenable to this kind of abstract simplifying, this 
systematic kind of legal synthesis. Formal legal materials only reflected 
this universally-valid, hierarchically-ordered system, with legal rule 
derivable from legal principle, and legal principle bridging one set of 
expansive legal concepts to another. Thus it came to resemble a formal 
axiomatic system, probably by design,
21
 but its underlying impulse was the 
orderly systematizing of the law on the books. 
To take one notorious example, Langdell encouraged his students to 
see the “bottom-level” rule22 governing the acceptance of an offer 
delivered through the mail not as a question of practicability, convenience, 
or justice, but as the conclusion of a demonstrative argument: a 
deductively-valid inference from a set of legal concepts and a legal 
principle underlying all of contract law. Insofar, that is, as a contract 
requires valid bargained-for consideration (a legal principle accepted on 
authority), which in the case of a bilateral contract must be a promise (due 
to the definitions of ‘bilateral contract’ and ‘consideration’), and since a 
promise made by letter cannot be conveyed to the promisee until she has 
read it, a contract by letter consequently cannot be considered made—the 
offer cannot be said to be accepted—until it has at least been received (the 
bottom-level rule of acceptance by mail). Thus, the formal legal 
materials—the principle and several basic concepts—had completely 
determined the choice of rule: strictly speaking, the only choice was 
whether to accept what the law entailed. So the alternative rule—that 
acceptance becomes effective as soon as the promisor drops the letter in 
the mail (and hence its later name, “the mailbox rule”)—could be 
confidently rejected out of hand, despite the weight of precedential 
 
 
or ‘strict liability.’ Categorical distinctions dividing areas of law—between tort and criminal law, say, 
or contracts and property—need not be of this kind, though they may be. In those cases where they are 
not, one could say they are differences of organizing captions rather than of operative concepts. Grey, 
supra note 10, at 1, 9 n. 28. 
 21. M.H. Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 95 (1986). 
 22. I adopt this term and way of framing this example from Thomas Grey’s insightful 
examination of the finer points of Langdell’s legal science. Grey, supra note 10, at 12. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/6
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authority backing it at the time (to say nothing about better sense),
23
 
simply for failing to square with the relevant legal principles and concepts. 
The formal legal materials had thus not only yielded a new rule for this 
novel case but had trumped another. Even the apparently hard case had an 
easy answer. 
That lesson, of course, was general.
24
 What was true of the mailbox 
rule could and should be true of all the common law, so Langdell believed, 
with bottom-rung rules systematically brought into line with higher-level 
legal principles that themselves drew on similarly expansive legal 
concepts. However dissimilar the dizzying diversity of cases and rules 
may have seemed, and however they clashed on the page, they all could 
nevertheless be seen pointing beyond themselves, to a conceptual system 
that would clarify and resolve them. The principle and concepts 
constitutive of that system could thus yield fresh rules in new cases, 
because they were in a sense already there, latent in the scheme they 
defined and only awaiting discovery and arrangement by the legal 
scientist, on the one hand, and use and elaboration by the scientifically 
trained lawyer on the other. Every case would be, quite literally in 
principle, an easy one. And a messy law of unsorted rules would thus 
harmonize into a tidy rule by absolutes. 
Joined to and rigidifying Langdell’s conceptualism, though not entailed 
by it,
25
 was his further belief that every legal question that did or could 
arise had a single, exact, and absolutely certain answer. His faith on this 
point, typifying his formalism,
26
 flowed from the thought that these 
higher-level conceptual materials could supply the premises of a 
demonstrative argument—argument that was deductively valid and 
perfectly exact in its subsumption of specific cases within its premises’ 
general terms.
27
 The “true lawyer,” as Langdell put it, could thus bring the 
law’s few fundamental doctrines to bear on legal subjects with a “constant 
 
 
 23. See Grey, supra note 10, at 20 (observing that the weight of English and American authority 
at the time appeared to side with the mailbox rule). 
 24. As Duncan Kennedy has pointed out, the doctrine of consideration could answer questions 
across contract law, including whether courts should enforce promises of gifts (no, absent grounds for 
promissory estoppel) or promises of compensation for a benefit previously conferred (no) or promises 
guaranteeing somebody else’s debts (no). Kennedy, supra note 9, at 100.  
 25. Grey, supra note 10, at 8–9 (noting that formal conceptualism differs from an informal one 
on just this entailment).  
 26. Brian Leiter has helpfully distinguished between two varieties of formalism: one vulgar, 
where reasoning from legal materials takes the literal form of the syllogism, and another more 
sophisticated version under which legal reasoning may stray from the syllogism while still remaining 
rationally determinate. Leiter, supra note 12, at 111.  
 27. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (discussing both of these 
aspects of formalism). 
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facility and certainty,” as he thought he had, for example, in the case of the 
mailbox rule. And although this would later be lampooned, not altogether 
unfairly, as a kind of ‘mechanical’ thinking (especially in the context of 
judicial adjudication), a little charity might instead lead one to say only 
that his formalism required legal reasoning to be in all cases rationally 
determinate.
28
  
Every legal question, that is, was thought to have a unique answer that 
followed demonstrably from what under one’s legal system counted as the 
relevant legal material, allowing of course for the conceptually wider 
sense in which Langdell thought of those materials. This meant that, in 
principle at least, every possible legal question was covered by the system 
both substantively and procedurally (the law was complete and 
comprehensive), and that there was never the risk—again, in principle—of 
reaching conflicting answers on any question (it was thus consistent).
29
 
Coupled to his conceptualism, Langdell’s formalism had thus hardened his 
understanding of law into a system that was as substantively as it was 
logically absolute. 
It is important to see, though, that simply saying Langdell took these 
higher-level conceptual materials to be conceptually and formally absolute 
did not mean that he must have believed they could not or did not 
evolve.
30
 After all, in the same breath that he called on lawyers to peel 
away the many obscuring layers of case law in order reveal the “few 
fundamental doctrines” just underneath, he also pointed out that law is a 
“growth,” having evolved into its present state only by “slow degrees.”31 
And in this way Langdell differed markedly from the early Scholastic 
Jurists who had expounded their own, similarly rationalistic legal science 
centuries before, relying on the then-recently rediscovered legal materials 
compiled centuries earlier under the Roman Emperor Justinian.
32
 For 
them, the Roman law revealed through Justinian’s Codex was more than 
just another legal system against which to compare and make a fresh study 
of their own local feudal customs. Rather, it was “an ideal law, a body of 
legal ideas, taken as a unified system,” much like the common law would 
later be imagined by Langdell.
33
 Yet, unlike Langdell, they had no sense of 
the evolutionary potential in the Roman materials from which they 
 
 
 28. See Leiter, supra note 12, at 111. 
 29. Grey, supra note 10, at 7–8. 
 30. See Grey, supra note 10, at 28 (discussing Langdell and his followers’ belief in the evolution 
of the common law). 
 31. LANGDELL, supra note 3. 
 32. Berman, supra note 15, at 898. 
 33. Id. at 907. 
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proceeded in their legal analytics. They instead treated the legal rules they 
found there (regulae) as what they called legal “maxims.” That term 
signified not what it does in English now—something closer to a rule of 
thumb or practical saying—but something theoretically far richer, and 
more absolute—what Aristotle had called a universal proposition, i.e., a 
proposition that was considered self-evidently true and which could form 
the major premise of a syllogism.
34
 These were rules in the sense of being 
“independent principles of universal validity” expressing “universal truth 
and universal justice,” and were therefore not thought to be subject to 
revision, let alone growth.
35
 Just like the legal principles and concepts 
Langdell had imagined settling between the lines of reported judicial 
opinions, the newly-recovered arsenal of Roman regulae were believed by 
the Scholastic Jurists to make possible a complete systematization of their 
canon and secular law. These Justinian maxims would thus serve as the 
conceptual lights by which they would cut their orderly analytical paths 
through a bewildering underbrush of legal materials they were only 
beginning to confront.  
And the reason they believed they could do this was the same as 
Langdell’s: they had assumed that the legal principles and concepts 
unearthed in the Roman texts could play the role of universally valid 
principles of legal reasoning for them—universal, that is, across the vast 
territory of legal materials they had set out to explore and classify and put 
in fresh order. So whatever differences there were between the 
Scholastic’s and Langdell’s legal science—and there were many—they did 
not fall in the roles they had each envisioned for their respective 
conceptual materials. Neither side doubted the universality of the 
principles and concepts they were synthesizing out of the welter of 
received legal norms. We might say that in both systems these conceptual 
materials were thus relatively absolute—central and indubitable, but only 
in relation to their respective legal systems.
36
  
Where, then, did the difference lie between these two theories of legal 
science such that Langdell could believe in the growth of his conceptual 
system while the Scholastics did not? The answer is likely found in the 
extraneous belief that the Scholastics had with regard to Roman law 
 
 
 34. The Latin term was also Aristotelian in origin, with “maximum proposition” translating the 
original Greek for “universal” (and hence the short-hand “maxim”). Id. at 917.  
 35. Id. at 918. 
 36. The belief in a kind of relative absolute or necessity may have its affinities with Hegel, yet it 
lives on today in decidedly un-Hegelian jurisprudential circles. See Brian Bix, Raz on Necessity, 22 
LAW & PHIL. 537 (2003) (discussing Joseph Raz’s appeals to necessity in his positivist analysis of the 
concept of law).  
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generally: they took that law to be more than just the law of a once living 
but then vanished legal system, but instead a “written embodiment of 
reason, ratio scripta”—not just absolute for them but for all rational 
thinkers.
37
 They therefore took these received maxims as at once 
timelessly and inerrantly true, much as they took the immutable truth of 
Scripture to foreclose the possibility of any later, incompatible 
revelation.
38
 Langdell, by contrast, who had read his Darwin
39
 and could 
look across the Atlantic to the unfolding of a rival common law, could not 
have seriously maintained that the legal principles and concepts he 
postulated for his legal science were the only ones possible, any more than 
a modern physicist could seriously deny the possibility of geometrical 
systems other than Euclidean, in light of our deepened understanding of 
phenomena on the scale of collapsing stars as well as falling apples. Law 
could not only have a structure but a history.
40
 From the standpoint of a 
lawyer working within the system of common law as it had evolved up to 
his time, Langdell was only expressing the obvious in saying that the legal 
principles and concepts he had ‘discovered’ there were universally—and 
in this sense absolutely—valid for them, much as latter-day physicists 
could assume the validity of the axioms and postulates of Riemannian 
geometry in working out the theory of general relativity. They were both 
thought to be on the order of universal generalizations, empirically 
observed and rigorously confirmed in their respective domains of fact: 
legal for Langdell, material for physicists.
41
 Each may have emerged to 
meet their specific intellectual—and in the case of law, broadly social—
needs, but each also had its own rational structure and a content, an inner 
logic, absolute in its own domain because universally true of it.  
Langdell had thus added to this tradition of legal science an 
importantly modern qualification: the recognition—almost too obvious to 
mention today—that there might not only be another, equally authoritative 
legal system, but one that also had a very different natural history, and, as 
a result, its own peculiar structure and content—its own inner logic. As to 
 
 
 37. BERMAN, supra note 9, at 204. 
 38. Id. at 918 (comparing the Scholastic Jurists’ treatment of Roman texts with scripture). This is 
not to say, however, that the jurists and canonists of the eleventh and twelfth centuries were not alive 
to the evolutionary potential of legal materials. See BERMAN, supra note 9, at 205 (noting that canon 
law showed “a quality of organic development” and “conscious growth over generations and 
centuries”).  
 39. See KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 26–27. 
 40. So Justice Holmes would later, anonymously, accuse Langdell of crypto-Hegelian 
sympathies. See Book Notices, supra note 2. 
 41. See Grey, supra note 10, at 18. 
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the content of his own legal system, however, Langdell joined the 
Scholastic Jurists in postulating a single system of legal principles and 
concepts spanning and determining the content of all of its authoritative 
materials, thus making possible demonstrative argument about and from 
them. And this formed the core of the first assumption he had thus shared 
with the jurists and canonists several hundred years before him: an 
absolutism as to the law’s content.  
2. The Methodological Assumption: Categorical Rationality 
The second major assumption made by the tradition of rationalist legal 
science reaching from the twelfth-century study of Justinian’s code into 
Langdell’s analysis of common law was methodological. Here, the central 
concern was not what a theory of legal science was about—viz., the 
conceptual absolutes just discussed—but how those conceptual materials 
were thought to be arrived at. And on this point, the modern and medieval 
legal sciences differed remarkably little, at least in general outline. The 
method they both envisioned was a distinctly rational one: a logically 
disciplined technique for the analysis and synthesis of legal texts that has 
sometimes, misleadingly, been referred to as induction, but which is better 
thought of as a process of abduction.
42
 It was a method conceived, 
moreover, in a similar spirit of absolutes. Drawn in the broad terms of 
categorical principles of rationality, the method would supposedly allow 
any legal scientist to extract from existing legal materials a body of correct 
or ‘true’43 legal principles and concepts—the absolutes discussed in the 
last section—from which they could then go on to solve new legal 
difficulties arising under novel circumstances, all along familiarly 
formalist and conceptualist lines. Their conceptual absolutism would thus 
be blessed by an infallible method.  
For the Scholastic Jurists who had pioneered this method by sorting 
through their ragbag of legal authorities—including everything from local 
custom to Roman law to Scripture—the constant burden was to find a way 
 
 
 42. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 27 (1949) (noting that legal 
reasoning “is not truly inductive,” since “[w]ith case law the concepts can be created out of particular 
instances”). The term ‘abduction’ is due to C.S. Peirce, and refers to the process by which explanatory 
hypotheses are drawn from empirical observation. It has been illuminatingly examined in the context 
of legal reasoning by Scott Brewer. See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, 
and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 925, 945–48 (1996).  
 43. I enclose the word in inverted commas to ward off the too-easy misinterpretation of this 
account of legal concepts and principles as presupposing a kind of Platonism. See Berman, supra note 
15, at 919–21 (discussing the nominalist backdrop to the Scholastic Jurists’ understanding of legal 
science). 
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of reconciling rules and principles that were clearly contradictory. And so, 
somewhat naturally, the technique they proposed took the form of a 
dialectic of opposites, a drama of abstractions shaped much like the 
disputes that took place before the courts of justice at the time, with cases 
presented for the respective sides that concluded either in their 
reconciliation or with the victory of one or the other.
44
 Thus a typical 
inquiry would begin with a question (quaestio) relating to a contradiction 
on some point of law derivable from authoritative sources, from there 
leading to the assertion of a main proposition (propositio) along with its 
opposite (oppositio), both of which were similarly elicited from 
authorities. A contest of claims would then follow, with reasons and 
arguments drawn up on both sides from still other authoritative texts, and, 
after consideration of each, resolution (solutio or conclusio) was arrived at, 
accepting one or the other, or their qualified reconciliation.
45
  
In an example that Berman provides from the canonist Gratian,
46
 both 
the New and Old Testaments were taken to forbid killing, yet each 
revealed cases where the use of deadly force had been approved. The 
question (quaestio) naturally became: when, if ever, was the use of force 
legally appropriate? Among its many precepts, Roman law had laid down 
the rule (propositio) that force could be used to repel force (vim vi 
repellere licet).
 47
 Meanwhile, one could equally point to the example and 
sayings of Jesus for the clearly contrary proposition that one should 
instead turn the other cheek (oppositio). The task for the scholar then 
became one of mediating these obviously contradictory positions, backed 
as they both were by equally weighty authority. They did this by a process 
of synthesis which we would now call abductive:
48
 the canonist would 
draw out of the litany of examples and cases from various authorities a 
rule best explaining and reconciling them, a rule that could then be used to 
answer the question presented in the immediate, target case.
49
 In the 
present example, the canonists like Gratian ultimately drew from the 
contrary maxims found in Roman law and the New Testament a 
reconciliation taking the form of a series of principles, or other ‘maxims,’ 
determined when force would be justified or excused (to defend oneself or 
 
 
 44. BERMAN, supra note 9, at 147–48. 
 45. Id. at 148. 
 46. This example was repeated elsewhere by other twelfth- and thirteenth-century canonists. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See supra note 42. 
 49. Berman has somewhat perplexingly likened this to the rule of inference, familiar from 
predicate logic, of existential generalization, but as explained above the reasoning involved is in fact 
abductive. See BERMAN, supra note 9, at 140; see also supra note 42. 
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one’s property, for example, or to see that the law is carried out). These 
were then repurposed in later cases to answer questions arising out of 
other seemingly unrelated civil and criminal contexts, even being pressed 
into farther-ranging disputes in political theory and theology (such as in 
the debates over ‘just war’).50  
Naturally, this is a simplified presentation of an already simple 
example. Of importance here, however, is simply the fact that this method 
was thought to embody a uniquely and categorically rational way of 
arriving at a set of legal principles and concepts that were themselves 
believed to underlie and determine the application of lower-level rules 
across widely varying contexts. In this way, a scattering of rules across 
dissimilar contexts and from different authorities could give rise to and 
justify a set of universally valid principles and concepts of law. Law 
would have both a unique subject-matter and a unifying method. Indeed, 
as Berman points out, it was precisely these twin beliefs that distinguished 
the way that the Scholastic Jurists and canonists had used the Roman legal 
materials (among others) from the use the Romans had themselves made 
of them. Although the Romans had the same legal concepts and ‘maxims’ 
at their disposal, they did not treat either “as ideas which pervaded the 
rules and determined their applicability,”51 and so they had no reason to 
think they required any sophisticated technique to reconcile the varying 
application of rules, or even different rules, in what looked to be 
substantially similar contexts.
52
 It was thus the canonists’ belief that 
behind these various and conflicting rules stood a unifying conceptual 
system—their faith in what I have called content absolutism—that had led 
them, unlike the Romans (who did not share it), to contrive a 
correspondingly rational method to elaborate and justify that system. Their 
theory of legal absolutes was bounded by an account of legal rationality.  
The modern method of legal science that flowered centuries later in 
American law schools would follow much the same pattern. For Langdell, 
who infamously led his curricular revolution at Harvard in the hopes of 
realizing this methodological ideal—bequeathing to us both the casebook 
and the cold call
53—the challenge presented by the common law was only 
 
 
 50. Their use of legal solutiones in these latter contexts was a natural consequence of their taking 
the Roman regulae as forming a body of law alongside the rules and doctrines that today’s hard 
positivists would consider strictly ethical or theological, i.e., non-legal, sources. See BERMAN, supra 
note 9, at 148. 
 51. Id. at 150. 
 52. Id. at 916 (noting that the “classical and postclassical Roman jurists thought of a legal rule as 
a generalization of the common elements of decisions in a restricted, specified class of cases”). 
 53. KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 6; WIECEK, supra note 5, at 93. 
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slightly less formidable than that faced by the twelfth-century canonists. If 
law consists of certain fundamental principles and concepts (the same 
absolutes discerned by the canonists in their own law), how does the legal 
scientist go about rooting those out from the plethora of cases standing for 
so many, often-conflicting rules and principles? Just as the canonists 
several centuries before him, Langdell sought his answer by way of an 
essentially abductive method.
54
 Much like those early jurists, that is, 
Langdell believed that by comparing the holdings of various common law 
appellate decisions (typically American, though occasionally British), one 
could arrive at a set of relatively few principles and concepts that, as we 
saw before, were fundamental to the common law (such notions as 
‘consideration’ or ‘bilateral contract’). These could then be used, as in the 
case of the mailbox-rule, to draw out conceptually the ‘correct’ bottom-
level rule in whatever situation at issue.
55
 In a perhaps surprising example 
of this method, Louis Brandeis, then a lawyer but later a Justice, would 
famously argue for the recognition of a right to privacy that was then 
unknown to the common law, but which he contended could be detected 
behind a range of seemingly far-flung cases from across the law of torts 
and property and contracts.
56
 Although he rested as much of his argument 
on policy grounds as he did on case law, his argumentative technique was 
otherwise impeccably Langdellian.
57
 He purported to have teased out of 
“existing law” a novel legal concept, capable of explaining those 
apparently unrelated decisions but also siring new doctrinal lines, as it 
would more than half a century later.
58
 
Conspicuously missing from examples like these, though, was even the 
intimation of the logically disciplined procedure that had been so 
prominently advertised in the casebook boilerplate and preached from law 
school podiums—a method worthy of the name. Indeed, that Brandeis 
could so easily mimic Langdell’s moves in pursuit of purposes that were 
rather doubtfully scientific in Langdell’s sense points to just how vain the 
talk of method could become on disbelieving lips. And, as we will see, this 
 
 
 54. Thomas Grey, though repeatedly likening this method to induction, also seems to imply that 
it would in fact be more accurately considered abductive. See Grey, supra note 10, at 18–19, 31. See 
also Brewer, supra note 42. 
 55. See Grey, supra note 10, at 19.  
 56. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). See Grey, supra note 
10, at 31. 
 57. His inquiry was accordingly whether “the existing law affords a principle which can properly 
be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such 
protection is.” See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 56, at 197. 
 58. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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was a weakness that the Legal Realists would later exploit disastrously. 
For now, though, the important point is simply that Langdell, like the 
Scholastic Jurists before him, nevertheless believed that an account of this 
method could be given—that there was a distinctive line of rationality 
running through the hand-waving talk that was capable of being traced out 
precisely and then rigorously translated elsewhere. And once it had been, 
it could decide and justify the selection of the principles and concepts that 
Langdell and his followers saw as the lifeblood of the common law.  
Of course, this was an assumption taken not only on faith but in a 
similar spirit of absolutes. Nowhere was this absolutism more glaring than 
in the way Langdell regarded and treated the law that fell outside the 
common law he took to be his method’s sole subject: namely, the growing 
body of statutory law and constitutional decisions that then was 
threatening to overtake, and since has overtaken,
59
 common law decision-
making as the preeminent source of American law. Finding them to be 
either too vague and unprincipled (like the constitutional doctrine of police 
powers) or too foreign to the existing stock of common law concepts to 
lend themselves to reasoned integration under his method,
60
 Langdell 
simply disregarded them as unfit for rational study. In the case of statutory 
law, he and his followers typically advocated, in formalist spirit, for strict 
literalism in interpretive method, and largely left it at that.
61
 And in the 
case of constitutional law, Langdell was of the opinion that it should not 
be taught in American law schools at all: his curriculum at Harvard for 
some years did not include it even as an elective, and he had nearly 
withdrawn the institutional support he pledged to the fledgling law faculty 
at the University of Chicago over their decision to offer it as a part of 
theirs.
62
  
All of this was absolutism at its purest, its most doctrinaire. And it all 
had flowed naturally from Langdell’s belief that the only areas of law 
allowing for rational study and synthesis—the law whose conceptual 
underpinnings were susceptible of categorical justification—were those 
belonging to judge-made private law. It was thus the modern triumph of 
the same methodological assumption shared by the jurists who given life 
to the idea of a legal science some eight hundred years before—an 
assumption typifying the rationalism of both.  
 
 
 59. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (noting the 
preeminence of legislation over judicial lawmaking in contemporary American law). 
 60. See Grey, supra note 10, at 34–35. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 34. 
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3. The Viewpoint Assumption: Strict Internalism 
The final assumption common to the tradition of legal science inherited 
from the Scholastic Jurists and swept into modernity by Langdell dealt 
with the type of theory of law they took their science to be. At the core of 
this assumption was a point of view about law itself—the way they looked 
at and approached the materials constitutive of their law in trying to 
analyze and synthesize it. As such, it has already been hinted at and 
evinced in the discussion of the two other assumptions they made about 
law; indeed, in a sense it had pervaded because it shaped the expression of 
both, in the same uncompromising spirit of absolutes. 
In each of the historical examples of legal science surveyed up to now, 
medieval and modern, we saw that the scholar who took up its work had 
presumed to derive from a collection of legal texts a body of highly 
general, abstract law—a system of conceptual absolutes drawn up with the 
absolute confidence of a rational method. The collection of texts he
63
 
chose was of course far from accidental. They were all taken as 
authorities, and worked out along lines that were considered 
authoritatively acceptable. In the case of the Scholastic Jurists this meant 
that the legal scientist would not only gloss Scripture but gloss it 
according to accepted interpretive strictures: dogma was as much a part of 
their intellectual equipment as the syllogism. For Langdell, case law had to 
be read in light of and somehow made consistent with prior cases that 
were “on point” (under the principle of stare decisis), distinguishing 
between what was essential to their conclusion as to law—the proposition 
they stood for, or their holding—and what in them was considered 
inessential, mere obiter dictum.
64
 These were the argumentative techniques 
and interpretive canons of lawyers who worked within the respective 
systems, in other words, those of participants who had accepted these 
materials and methods and thus felt bound to respect them in their thinking 
and theorizing.
65
 Together they therefore reflect a certain attitude or point 
 
 
 63. And at the time, the legal scientist was always—regrettably—a “he.”  
 64. See Harold Berman, The Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 
45 EMORY L.J. 437, 447 (1996) 
 65. Some writers have taken the distinction between the internal and external points of view to 
align with the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. See Richard L. Schwartz, 
Internal and External Method in the Study of Law, 11 LAW & PHIL. 179, 179–180 (1992) (contrasting 
the internal point of view, as “a species of practical reason,” with the external point of view’s allegedly 
“cognitive and theoretical” stance). Here, however, I assume the internal point of view capacious 
enough to include both an academic and practical dimension. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal 
Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 827 (1989) (noting that Holmes allowed both a practical and more 
theoretical stance within the internal point of view).  
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of view that we all can and do take toward at least some norms, of which 
the legal is only one kind—a point of view which has since come to be 
known as internal.
66
 An external point of view, by contrast, takes none of 
these techniques or canons or even materials as authoritatively given. They 
are as much open to rejection or acceptance, revision or reinterpretation, as 
any other intellectual commitment, equally up for grabs. The external view 
is that taken by the detached and disinterested outsider; the internal that of 
the invested, convention-bound participant. And as is clear from the 
description, the point of view presumed by both the medieval and modern 
legal sciences was resolutely internal.  
As much as this internal point of view had colored and shaped the way 
the Scholastic Jurists and Langdell had respectively worked out the other 
two assumptions of their legal science, those assumptions also fed back 
into and reshaped the point of view they took toward their working 
materials. Once they had come to see in their authoritative legal materials 
the dim reflection of a far larger and more absolute system of legal 
concepts and principles, one whose truth they could assure categorically 
and apply with unquestioning confidence and certainty, they no longer had 
any reason to believe they needed to look outside that system to 
understand law at all. All one would ever need to know in order to 
understand and use the law was right there in the legal materials 
themselves—in the regulae of Justinian or the decisions of the Supreme 
Judicial Court. An absolutism as to the law’s content and methodology 
had thus given their tradition of legal science over to an attitude that was 
more than just resolute, but itself absolutist. Theirs was a strictly internal 
point of view, one that could on principle refuse the advances of 
disciplinary outsiders as just that—outside law and so simply irrelevant to 
it.  
Here again there were differences between the medieval and modern 
variants of legal science, none starker than in the sense that they could and 
did regard law as autonomous.
67
 In one sense, as we just saw, both could 
equally lay claim to a kind of intellectual autonomy, in the sense of the 
independence of legal thinking from other disciplinary modes of inquiry 
 
 
 66. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56–57 (2d ed. 1994); see generally Michael Steven 
Green, Leiter on the Legal Realists, 30 LAW & PHIL. 381 (2011) (discussing the prediction theory 
along with rival accounts of law offered by the American Legal Realists). 
 67. The two senses of law’s autonomy I discuss here are the same that Judge Posner has 
suggested, and rejected, in several places. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 17 (1995); 
Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
761 (1987); Richard Posner, Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline? U. 
TORONTO L.J. 333 (1988) [hereinafter Conventionalism]. 
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and thought. Yet in another sense of autonomy—the independence of law 
from broader societal pressures and practical needs—the two schools 
parted ways, owing to the same difference they had in background 
intellectual assumptions that were seen in the way they worked out their 
absolutism as to the law’s content. On the one hand, the Scholastic Jurists 
could legitimately, or understandably anyway, believe that their legal 
science was capable of being worked out independent of larger and more 
diffuse societal pressures, whether political or economic or sociological, 
not only because they took their maxims as tantamount to natural law, but 
because they had little reason, looking around at what they knew of 
history, to think much if anything had materially changed in the 
millennium separating them from the Romans (whose law they were busy 
systematizing). Law had a reason and a literature all its own, and could 
thus comfortably seclude itself from other societal forces when settling its 
own account. It could realize a full autonomy—autonomy in both senses. 
Not so for Langdell and his legal science, steeped as he and it both were in 
the historical and historicizing consciousness of the common law. For him, 
as we saw in his assumption as to the law’s content, law had a reason but 
also a history, and so it naturally lent itself to an understanding that was at 
least partly sensitive and responsive to shifting circumstance, even if this 
was still only visible through the refracting medium of case law. Law in 
his eyes could not quite achieve an absolute autonomy in the end, but 
nearly so. Yet this “nearly” was enough to justify its claim to an absolute 
intellectual autonomy, rooted as that was in the strictly internal attitude 
that Langdell, like his scholastic predecessors, had taken toward the law. 
This was the only sense of autonomy, and the last absolute, needed to 
complete the rationalism of their common tradition of legal science.  
B. Rationalism and the Traditional Science of Law  
That the tradition of legal science sketched above was in fact only 
that—a single tradition, flowing from a far broader idea and ideal—has 
been remarked surprisingly little by intellectual historians of law, let alone 
by legal philosophers. Instead the very idea of legal science has tended to 
be assimilated to this traditional interpretation, often wholesale, and only 
then to be written off as the relatively minor, philosophically 
unsophisticated episode in the intellectual history of law that it largely 
was
68—as naïve in its confusions as it was unoriginal in its insights. Yet 
 
 
 68. As noted earlier, Leiter has thus called this view, by no means eccentrically, a “Vulgar 
Formalism.” See supra note 26. 
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this is a mistake, and a philosophically important one at that. Not only is 
the idea of a legal science clearly distinguishable from this traditional 
understanding of its premises, but wresting the idea out of its traditional 
context can help us see in it some critical lessons for the study of all 
manner of legal phenomena, legal thinking above all. We can reject what 
was spurious, implausible, and frankly silly in traditional legal science 
without turning our backs on the insights of legal science altogether. But 
to do this we will need to have clearly before us what legal science entails 
more generally—the sense of legal science at which Langdell’s 
contemporaries had not batted an eye—and how the tradition begun in the 
twelfth century and brought to its modern maturity in America ended up 
distorting it. 
In one sense, as noted at the outset, Langdell was hardly sounding a cry 
to revolution in declaring law a science, and the library its laboratory. 
After all, in a wider sense of the word, the one likely familiar to the 
lawyers he was addressing that day, law truly was scientific. For it was 
(1) a relatively distinct body of abstract knowledge that (2) was studied in 
an intellectual culture valuing objective inquiry and research and (3) had 
the backing of a loose network of institutions (academic faculties 
principally) willing and able to keep its researchers working and its doors 
open to the students who would later join its ranks as fellow researchers. 
These are what Berman has identified as the three fundamental premises 
of a legal science—what we could call the intellectual, the cultural, and the 
institutional premises. And it was out of those premises that a coherent 
theory of legal science emerged among the twelfth century jurists and 
canonists,
69
 and reached maturity in America with Langdell. But legal 
science in this wider, pre-theoretical sense sweeps more broadly than a 
theory about just what law or legal thinking involves. It instead denotes a 
far richer and more complex social phenomenon, of which the growth of 
the modern university and its diversifying techniques and norms in 
scholarship and research, the changing relationship between faculties and 
the profession and between law and other disciplines, are all integral 
elements. It is this more generic idea of legal science, consisting of these 
three premises, that is the more fundamental, and which I will therefore 
refer to simply as legal science. And in this wider, more fundamental 
sense, the idea of legal science is clearly applicable to both the modern and 
medieval exemplars surveyed in this section. 
 
 
 69. For Berman, they also forged the first working “prototype” of science in its modern sense. 
See BERMAN, supra note 9, at 151.  
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Just as clearly, though, the point runs deeper than mere terminological 
fastidiousness. For once we cleanly separate out this more fundamental 
idea of legal science from the historical tradition with which it is often 
conflated, we can begin to see why that tradition was in fact only that: a 
particular, traditional way of interpreting that more fundamental idea. And, 
moreover, what had made that tradition of legal science truly distinctive 
was the particular picture it supposed of the intellectual premise of the 
law, a picture filled in with the bold strokes of absolutism as to the law’s 
content, methodology, and viewpoint. That tradition, as we saw, assumes 
the law to consist in a single, universally-valid and in this sense an 
absolute system of legal principles and concepts (content absolutism) that 
would be known and categorically justified by equally universally-valid, 
absolute principles of legal reasoning (methodological absolutism), and 
autonomously worked out from a strictly internal point of view (viewpoint 
absolutism). Together these three absolutist assumptions frame what I 
have called the rationalism of that tradition. And that rationalism made up 
the core of that tradition’s sense of what the law is and, just as 
importantly, what it should be. Precisely because they saw the law as 
implicitly embodying this systematic conceptual whole, these lawyers also 
believed, as scholars and not just practitioners of the law, they should try 
to give as full an expression of it as they could. It was as much an idea as 
an ideal of a science of law, no less an empirical description as the 
articulation of a working program—the program of a rationalist legal 
science.  
Just to see things this way, though, opens up the prospect of a broader 
reexamination of that traditional account of legal science, letting in a fresh 
view of exactly where and how it went wrong. Assuming as most rightly 
do today that Langdell and the Scholastic Jurists were wrong about the 
viability of their legal science, it hardly follows that the nub of that error 
was their belief that law could be a science in any sense. Indeed, their 
mistake could well have fallen in the way they drew up the intellectual 
premise of that legal science: in the absolutist way they had framed the 
three assumptions outlining the intellectual character of the law. It is 
entirely possible, that is, that their blunder lay not in their belief in a 
science of law as such but in the rationalism of theirs. As I argue in the 
next section, we can indeed take Legal Realism as having shown exactly 
that: it was their absolutism as to the intellectual character of law—their 
rationalism—that they were led astray, and their science led aground. 
Once we abandon that absolutist way of understanding the intellectual 
premise of legal science, however, and come to grips with the reasons why 
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it was bound to fail, we will also see why the idea and ideal of legal 
science in another sense need not have been abandoned.  
II. NATURALIZING LAW: THE PROSPECTS OF A PRAGMATIC LEGAL 
SCIENCE  
Nearly a decade after Langdell first outlined the assumptions of his 
science of law in the preface to his first casebook, a short, unsigned review 
of its second edition appeared in the American Law Review.
70
 Its author 
was a then-relatively obscure Boston attorney and a future colleague of 
Langdell’s—Oliver Wendell Holmes. And like the remarks of Langdell’s 
that it was nominally out to discuss, it swelled with its own revolutionary 
ambition. “The life of the law has not been logic,” read its one 
unforgettable line, “it has been experience.”71 And as is clear from that 
line alone, its ambition was in many ways sharply opposed to Langdell’s, 
even if, in others, it was also deeply sympathetic.
72
 Those points of 
sympathy and disagreement combine to tell the now familiar story of the 
jurisprudential movement that took them as its fighting faith—the 
movement now known as American Legal Realism.
73
 But they also tell a 
less familiar story: a story not only about how and why the legal science 
that the Legal Realists rose up against ultimately declined and fell, but also 
why it need not have. It is the arc of this lesser known tale that I trace in 
this section, beginning with the critical lessons that the Realists taught 
about the science of law and leading from there to a brief account of how 
one of their fellow-travelers—John Dewey—sought to turn those lessons 
into the tools for its reconstruction.  
A. The Critical Thesis: Some Realism about Legal Reasoning 
Even if, as the saying goes, we are all realists now, we can also now 
say that there never was a single view that went by the name.
74
 More a 
mood and a movement than a self-conscious philosophy, Legal Realism 
 
 
 70. See Book Notices, supra note 2. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Grey, supra note 65, at 822 (discussing Holmes’ attraction to the formalism and 
conceptualism distinctive of Langdell’s legal science).  
 73. Although throughout I will refer to this movement as “Legal Realism” and the various 
figures within it as the “Realists,” there was in fact another Scandinavian school that went by the same 
name in roughly the same years, though of dissimilar views. They are not the subject of the discussion 
here. 
 74. See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, in 
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 15, 15–17 (2007). 
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has long stood on less than sure, indeed often contested, theoretical 
grounds. Yet in the last twenty-five years or so a fairly clear consensus has 
nevertheless emerged around several key claims, all of which do seem to 
distinguish and typify the Realist point of view tolerably well. Those 
claims can all be found more or less distinctly in Holmes’ early, 
anonymous critique of Langdell’s first casebook, the fount of his legal 
science.
75
  
As noted, there were points of both strong affinity and even stronger 
difference between Holmes’ thinking and the legal science that Langdell 
advertised at the beginning of his tenure as a legal scholar proper. His 
review thus divided down the middle: part criticism, part proposal. “Mr. 
Langdell’s ideal in the law,” the critique began, “the end of all his striving, 
is the elegantia juris, or logical integrity of the system as a system.”76 Yet 
this preoccupation “with the formal connection of things” not only led 
away from the forces that “have actually shaped the substance of the law,” 
“the felt necessity” that is “the seed of every new growth within its 
sphere.” Worse, it tempted the false impression that the law was in 
substance “a form of continuity” resembling “a logical sequence,” as if the 
form and the sequence were anything but “the evening dress which the 
new-comer puts on to make itself presentable.”77 Drawing this line of 
criticism to a positive point, the review went on:  
The important phenomenon is the man underneath it, not the coat . . 
. No one will ever have a truly philosophical mastery over law who 
does not habitually consider the forces which have made it what it 
is. More than that, he must remember that as it embodies the story 
of a nation’s development through many centuries, the law finds its 
philosophy not in self-consistency, which it must always fail in so 
long as it continues to grow, but in history and the nature of human 
needs.
78
 
In the end, then, the great “legal theologian”79 had not only misunderstood 
how law had come to be, but even what it was—a creature not of logic but 
of experience. 
 
 
 75. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 444 
(1899). 
 76. Book Notices, supra note 2. 
 77. Book Notices, supra note 2. 
 78. Id. 
 79. This was no idle slur either. As a typical contemporary of Langdell’s wrote of his religious 
thinking: “I may describe my forward step by saying that hitherto I had been using the Bible in light of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2017] LAW WITHOUT ABSOLUTES 245 
 
 
 
 
1. Practical Indeterminacy  
We will return to the proposal shortly. But the criticism on display in 
these few lines not only cut deeply into the credibility of Langdell’s legal 
science; it had also set terms of a twofold critique that later came to define 
the loose movement of lawyers and legal scholars now known as the 
American Legal Realists. That critique takes its point of departure from 
one of the claims that we saw was basic to Langdell’s thinking about the 
law: that it was a complete, comprehensive, and consistent system of legal 
principles and concepts that was, as such, rationally determinate.
80
 For 
Langdell, as we saw in the mailbox example, this meant that there was a 
unique, demonstrably correct answer to every legal question based solely 
on the relevant legal materials—one which spanned the higher-level 
doctrinal concepts and principles perhaps unseen in the individual case, 
but discernible from the entire line of relevant cases. And on this point one 
might say that Holmes simply called Langdell’s empirical bluff. As a point 
of fact as opposed to the exigency of a theory, why would anybody ever 
believe the law to be nearly this complete and consistent, this determinate? 
How could any lawyer, for that matter, believe that the form of a well-
crafted judicial opinion, dressed as it is in a gown of demonstrative 
inferences, would actually reflect the substance of the thinking behind it? 
And if the legal reasoning on the page could and did diverge this 
systematically from the legal thinking that actually went into reaching 
some legal conclusion, how could Langdell then say so confidently that 
the result in those cases had been determined by the legal reasons set forth 
there? Worse, what if the operative considerations were not even legal 
reasons at all, but the very reasons of justice and equity and convenience 
Langdell had brushed aside as too vague and unprincipled, too 
unscientific? 
Questions like these help to frame the now standard problem of legal 
indeterminacy, in one of its forms anyway,
81
 and they formed the core of 
 
 
its statements, but that now I found myself using it in light of its principles.” WILLIAM N. CLARKE, 
SIXTY YEARS WITH THE BIBLE: A RECORD OF EXPERIENCE 120–21 (1909). 
 80. The qualification matters here: despite the carelessness of some of Holmes’ language in his 
review, very few Realists had or need have denied that the law was rationally determinate in at least 
some cases, rather than in the relatively few that end up on appeal at prominent state and federal 
courts. Yet their differences with Langdell were no less real for being so modest: after all, to disagree 
with Langdell all one had to believe was that the law was indeterminate somewhere. That Langdell 
could not concede even this little to Realism was a consequence of his absolutism—his rationalism.  
 81. Another sense of indeterminacy often mentioned in connection with Legal Realism results 
from the open-texture, or potential vagueness, inherent in every term with empirical significance—a 
linguistic indeterminacy (as in the standard example of a stroller pushed through a park with a sign 
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the skeptical challenge pressed by the Realists against Langdell’s legal 
science. For these questions point up two potential gaps in what Langdell 
saw as the law’s seamless conceptual fabric. The first falls between the so-
called “paper rule” and the real rule governing a legal question.82 On this 
score, one need only think of the forgiving way that police and the courts 
enforce posted speed limits: the sign on the highway may say 55 miles per 
hour, but in point of fact police rarely ticket, and courts seldom uphold 
citations against, drivers caught going 60 miles per hour.
83
 The actual 
“law” of the enforced speed limit—anywhere from five to nine miles per 
hour over the speed limit—thus strays from the law of the posted sign. 
Another gap falls between the legal reasons formally offered as the 
grounds for the conclusion reached and the unstated non-legal reasons that 
had actually produced it.
84
 Here the Realists could point to the bevy of 
appellate decisions where judges openly drew not on formal legal 
materials to reach their conclusions, but on what were, by nearly all 
accounts, clearly non-legal reasons, and especially the factual 
circumstances under which the case arose (or “situation types,” as Karl 
Llewellyn named them).
85
 In either case, it would obviously be impossible 
to say that the law on the books had in fact determined a result: it would at 
most only have appeared to. And were this phenomenon a genuine one, it 
would likewise be impossible for Langdell to claim that law was rationally 
determinate in all cases. As these gaps appeared to open and grow, so did 
the doubts as to just how universally determinate—and universal—the law 
really was.  
And yet, forceful as doubts like these were and are, they still had only 
set the terms of a problem for a rationalist like Langdell, and an empirical 
problem at that—a practical indeterminacy in the law. As only a 
 
 
warning, “No Vehicles in the Park”). Even though Hart appears to have taken this to be a major front 
in the Realist war against the determinacy of legal rules, this indeterminacy did not loom large in 
Realist thinking. See Leiter, supra note 12, at 111 (observing that “most legal reasoning in common-
law jurisdictions is given over to explaining why the applicable rule of law is, in fact, the applicable 
rule of law”); Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 205, 211–12 (1986) (same); see also Frederick Schauer, Authority and Indeterminacy, 20 NOMOS 
28, 30 (1987) (noting that distinction between open texture and actual vagueness). 
 82. See Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749 (2014) (discussing this 
distinction). 
 83. Id. at 767–68. 
 84. See Leiter, supra note 74, at 24.  
 85. A notorious example of this is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 
(1892) (refusing to apply a federal statute prohibiting foreign labor against the hiring of a minister 
because, as a “Christian nation,” the Court did not “believ[e] that a Congress of the United States 
intended to make it a misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for the services of a 
Christian minister residing in another nation”). 
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descriptive claim about the way law worked in practice, its force as an 
objection stood or fell by what it purported to reveal about legal thinking, 
what the facts really were. Just how real and pervasive a phenomenon was 
this apparent indeterminacy, and what was its cause? Given how the 
Realists tended to answer on these empirical points, it is hard to see, at 
first blush anyway, just how much of an objection they really could make 
to Langdell’s science.  
First of all, they generally did not claim this indeterminacy spread 
much if at all beyond cases decided by appellate courts; they were thus 
highly unrepresentative of legal questions at large, with some being 
virtually by definition incredibly close, very hard cases. As only a select 
few of an already skewed sample of cases, what if these alleged instances 
of indeterminacy were then traceable to the sloppiness or dishonesty of the 
relatively few judges who decided them, or to new areas of law where 
there were few if any prior cases to begin with? In those cases, the gaps 
between formal legal materials and legal outcomes may have been real but 
inconsequential, being the result of the normative failings of relatively few 
officials or an understandable underdevelopment of the law, not an 
essential shortcoming in the legal materials themselves. Where the 
indeterminacies were due to the former, they would no more have argued 
against the determinacy of the law in fact than a few bad calls by a handful 
of corrupt or incompetent referees would argue against the determinacy of 
the rules of football—or to take an analogy closer in spirit to Langdell’s 
science, no more than the fudged calculations of a few careless or 
unscrupulous engineers would call into question the truth of Newton’s 
laws of motion. And where indeterminacies resulted from 
underdevelopment, the objection more begs the question than proves it: 
only if one restricted the relevant legal materials to the words on the page 
of the case reporters, as Langdell clearly would not, would the criticism go 
through. The whole conceit of a conceptual system, after all, is to supply 
principled answers where formal legal materials turn up empty. However 
real (or apparent) these discrepancies were between the formal legal 
materials and the actual legal conclusions drawn, they were nevertheless 
far from amounting to an objection in principle to thinking of the law as 
fully rationally determinate. At most they could be seen as empirical 
outliers, mere anomalies that Langdell could explain by explaining them 
away, at least in general terms.  
Of course, if the discrepancies grew too numerous and widespread, one 
might begin to think differently about the force of this evidence. If, in 
other words, this indeterminacy ran rampant throughout a legal system, 
leaving no reliable correspondences between formal legal materials and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
248 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 9:219 
 
 
 
 
the results in particular cases (as some of the more extravagant Realists 
were wont to say),
86
 one might well be led to think—as an inference to a 
better explanation—that the rationalist assumptions behind Langdell’s 
science were seriously off the mark. In that case, one could fairly wonder 
whether the formal legal materials (and, a fortiori, any conceptual 
systematization of them) were really the key to understanding the 
intellectual character of the law at all. A judge’s decision might just as 
well be prefigured in her breakfast as from her bookshelves.  
Few of the Realists ever went this far, however. Indeed, the consensus 
now has it that the core Realist claims to indeterminacy by and large 
focused instead on the fringe of cases that made it to adjudication on the 
merits at state and federal appellate courts. Indeterminacy may have been 
alive and well in the law, but it ran on a fairly short empirical leash—well 
short of seriously calling into question, on its own, the premises of 
Langdell’s legal science. What the Legal Realists therefore needed, and 
what they later gave, was some explanation as to why this indeterminacy 
was not only practically significant but also a principled problem. They 
needed a kind of indeterminacy that a rationalist like Langdell would not 
be able to simply brush aside as an anomaly, as practically real yet 
explicable nonetheless.  
2. Principled Indeterminacy 
The Realists ultimately found the indeterminacy they were looking for 
just where one might have expected it: in the way Langdell framed the 
method he believed would determine and justify the selection of the legal 
principles and concepts making up the backbone of the common law. 
Drawing on the same body of evidence on which Langdell had built his 
own system (typically state appellate decisions), the Realists showed that 
there was not one but always several conflicting rules available in any 
case, rules that, crucially for the Realists, and devastatingly for Langdell, 
could draw support from equally justifiable but incompatible 
conceptualizations of the doctrines and facts at hand. Indeterminacy 
necessarily fringes the law, the Realists claimed, because there, along that 
small but salient margin of cases, the law inevitably runs out.
87
 A typical 
example from the heyday of Legal Realism, from one of the judges often 
said to have embodied it,
88
 will help flesh out this point. 
 
 
 86. See, e.g., FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS! (2d ed. 1957). 
 87. Leiter, supra note 12, at 112. 
 88. See RICHARD POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 31–32 (1990) (observing “that 
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In June 1914, the firm of Jacob & Youngs put the final touches on a 
country house they built for a man by the name of Kent, costing 
somewhere north of $77,000. For reasons lost to history, as a part of their 
contract, Kent had specified that: “All wrought-iron pipe must be well 
galvanized, lap welded pipe of the grade known as ‘standard pipe’ of 
Reading manufacture.”89 At some point the following March, Kent 
discovered that a considerable amount of the pipe installed in the house 
was not of Reading but some other manufacture.
90
 He informed his 
architect, who in turn instructed the firm to redo the piping according to 
the terms of the contract, a do-over which, by that point, would have 
required them to tear down large swaths of the house, obviously at 
considerable cost. The firm refused, instead demanding final payment. 
Kent also refused, citing the unsuitable pipes. In the suit subsequently 
brought by the firm seeking the outstanding balance, the New York trial 
court directed a verdict for Kent, but only after excluding evidence offered 
by the firm that showed the pipe used was in all respects, except its brand, 
identical with the Reading pipe contracted for.  
The case eventually found its way to the Court of Appeals of New 
York, and into the hands of Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo. The 
question on which it turned was deceptively simple: in the absence of a 
provision clearly addressing the matter, what was required of the firm in 
order to be entitled to payment?
91
 The general rule in American law is that, 
in the absence of an express provision by the parties to the contrary, courts 
will imply a condition requiring the adequate performance of the seller 
before any payment from the buyer legally comes due.
92
 But what would 
make for an adequate performance in this case? Here two rules presented 
themselves, vying equally for plausibility. On the one hand, in cases of the 
“simple and uniform” such as in “a sale of common chattels,” the rule has 
been for ‘perfect tender,’ giving the buyer the right to reject without 
liability any performance that fails to live up to the precise specifications 
found in the contract. Here, of course, this rule would have entitled the 
 
 
little that has survived of legal realism cannot be found, more articulately as well as more temperately 
expressed, in Cardozo’s jurisprudential writings”); Richard D. Friedman, Cardozo the [Small r] 
realist, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1738, 1752 (2000) (noting that Cardozo understood the “substantial degree” 
to which judges are not “constrained by doctrine”). 
 89. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 240 (1921). 
 90. The dissent noted that the total amount of pipe of Reading manufacture appeared to be only 
two-fifths of that installed. Jacob & Youngs, 230 N.Y. at 246.  
 91. Here I am following the very insightful analysis of this case offered by Todd Rakoff. See 
Todd D. Rakoff, Implied Terms of Contracts: Of ‘Default Rules’ and ‘Situation-Sense’, in GOOD 
FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 191, 203–213 (1997). 
 92. Id. at 203. 
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defendant Kent to reject the house as delivered, and refuse final payment, 
all because of the plaintiff firm’s evident failure to mind its brand-names 
when shopping for pipe.
93
 On the other hand, in those cases dealing in the 
“multifarious and intricate,” such as in contracts for literal performances 
and other one-off, special arrangements (say, for the construction of a 
“mansion or a ‘skyscraper’”),94 the common law rule had long been for 
‘substantial performance’, which allowed the seller minor deviations from 
the details set down in the contract without risking its right to payment 
(subtracting whatever damages resulted from the non-conformity). Under 
this rule, it was Kent who then would be out of luck. With the evidence 
excluded at trial tending to show that the difference in value and quality of 
the pipe was either “nominal or nothing,”95 what breach there was of the 
agreement was minor at worst (not material, in legal terms). As a practical 
matter, it was thus beyond dispute that the firm had substantially lived up 
to its agreement on this point. Kent would have to pay up.  
There were thus two opposing rules open to the court, leading to 
inconsistent results. Which should govern? If it is difficult to imagine just 
what Langdell would have said here that is because the choice facing the 
court seems so obviously unavoidable. This is not to say that arguments, 
even apparently demonstrative ones, could not be given. He might well 
have looked askance at the entire line of cases upholding a rule for 
substantial performance, for example, sensing how vague and 
undisciplined their inquiries into the substantiality of performance would 
necessarily become (was two-fifths conformity really substantial, and how 
could one say?), and how unsystematically they would vary across cases 
as a result. Adopting a standard this conceptually slack would in any case 
be to let judicial sympathy oust formal precision: it would let the distaste 
for the perhaps silly punctiliousness of one defendant overrule the need of 
preserving scientific rigor across the law. And as we saw, Langdell’s 
science was nothing if not driven by concern for just this sort of formal 
 
 
 93. Moreover, this would have justified the trial court’s refusal to admit the evidence as to the 
pipe’s value: all that mattered was whether the firm had lived up to the letter of its bargain, which, 
here, it clearly had not. There is thus a clear connection between this formalism and the thinking that 
came by most accounts to dominate American law in the late nineteenth century. See MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 9–31 (1992); see also Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal 
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RESEARCH IN L. & 
SOCIOLOGY 3, 4–5 (Steven Spitzer ed. 1980) (discussing the rise of classical legal thought); NEIL 
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 9–32 (1995) (reviewing classical legal thought 
as a “formalism”). 
 94. Jacob & Youngs, 230 N.Y. at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 95. Id. at 244. 
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precision and conceptual tidiness, nowhere more glaring than in his 
dismissal of constitutional law.
96
 
Even if this were a plausible (or plausibly rationalist) resolution of the 
case, it is frankly impossible to see how Langdell’s method could justify 
it. As Cardozo put the point, almost as if thinking of Langdell: “Those 
who think of symmetry and logic in the development of legal rules than of 
practical adaptation to the attainment of a just result will be troubled by a 
classification where the lines of division are so wavering and blurred.”97 
The familiar metaphor Cardozo uses here, of dividing lines cutting across 
conceptual space, may lead one to think all he meant to point out were the 
usual vagaries of general classifications, and why choice necessarily 
followed—a line of thinking also frequently associated with the Realists.98 
But not only would that have failed to answer an argument like the one 
hazarded above (except question-beggingly), it would also have missed an 
importantly different, and no less distinctively Realist, line of analysis one 
could instead see him advancing there. As Cardozo suggests, the reason 
why these two rules had appeared among the cases to begin with was that, 
among those same cases, there were two distinct ways of conceptualizing 
the underlying doctrine requiring performance before payment. The 
bottom-level rule specifying the implied condition divided because the 
higher-level doctrine itself fractured along two different understandings.  
One can see this fracture emerge from the way that the doctrine was 
portrayed from one line of cases to the next, with what Cardozo called the 
“simple and uniform” typically set to one side, and the “multifarious and 
intricate” swept to the other. In the former cases, as in the sale of 
manufactured goods, it made a good deal of sense to think of 
‘performance’ as involving execution of exact specifications. Items like 
these were often easily made and sold in large quantities, so that even if 
they were not always as simple as crates of apples or boxes of staples, they 
were at least reasonably generic, and so generally replaceable without 
extravagant effort or loss. Under circumstances like these (a ‘situation-
type’ in Llewellyn’s sense), where a performance was more naturally 
thought of as a literal reproduction of some item, a rule for perfect tender 
only made sense (in what Llewellyn would call ‘situation-sense’). Not so, 
however, in the latter cases, where what was contracted for was 
stereotypically much less like a mass-manufactured toy or a bag of onions. 
In these cases, the performances agreed to were instead more one-off, 
 
 
 96. See supra note 62. 
 97. Jacob & Youngs, 230 N.Y. at 242–43. 
 98. See supra note 81. 
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more complex and individualized—like painting a portrait or playing a gig 
or putting up a skyscraper. In these circumstances, and in contrast to those 
in the case of sales of goods, ‘performance’ was more naturally thought to 
entail a standard of approximate rather than exact reproduction: it would 
be silly after all to feel cheated when the crooner at the mic sounds little 
like the bodiless voice in the earbuds. In situations of this type, a rule 
requiring substantial performance, rather than literal conformity, had only 
made sense.  
Not only, then, were both of these rival rules equally and amply 
justified by the case law, but so too were the rival doctrinal 
conceptualizations that made sense of them. And the latter was the truly 
decisive point. Each rule could lay claim to an equally justifiable 
conceptualization—what we might call a model99—of the same pivotal 
doctrine, a model that would then systematize, as its doctrinal 
consequences, the relevant area of law into directly applicable, bottom-
level rules. Here, where that doctrine called on the court to imply a 
condition for adequate performance, Cardozo then faced not only the 
choice of which bottom-level rule to apply (perfect tender versus 
substantial performance) but also, and more importantly, the choice of 
how to think of the higher-level concept (‘performance’) that would decide 
the fitness of that rule. Deciding which rule to apply meant that Cardozo 
would have to choose which of these models better fit the facts of the case. 
Did this look more like a sale of a crate of oranges (the sale-of-goods 
model) or more like a promise to paint somebody’s portrait (the unique-
performance model)? To Cardozo and a majority of the court the 
practicalities decisively favored the latter: Kent would have to pay. But as 
Cardozo heavily underlined, there was simply no formally conceptual way 
out of the decision they as judges had to make:
100
 no amount of analyzing 
and synthesizing case law would relieve them of their burden of choice 
since both models had (and still do have) a place in our law. The lines of 
 
 
 99. I adopt the term from Ronald Giere, who has argued that models in essentially the same sense 
capture the “cognitive structure” of all scientific theories. See GIERE, supra note 16, at 97–117 (1999); 
Ronald Giere, An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scientific Representation, 172 SYNTHESE 
269 (2010). 
 100. A less formalist conceptualist, perhaps like Ronald Dworkin, might argue that Cardozo was 
wrong if he thought that no conceptualist argument could decide between one model or another. See 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); see also Grey, supra note 10, at 9, n.27 (noting that 
Dworkin exemplifies an informal conceptualism). The Thomistic doctrine of determinatio might also 
have been a gesture in this direction. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, Ia–IIæ q.95 a.2. 
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decision had indeed blurred—precisely where, and because, the conceptual 
shadows had crossed.
101
 
Here was a kind of legal indeterminacy that no rationalist legal science 
would be able to explain away, to dismiss as an explicable outlier, an 
indeterminacy that therefore meant the end of their science, as they had 
understood it.
102
 It was one thing for the Realists to point to the hard cases 
of law, like those that often come before appellate courts, where the paper 
rules seemed not to determine the results reached by the courts, and leave 
it at that. This practical indeterminacy was perhaps a troubling, even 
embarrassing, fact for a rationalist like Langdell to explain, but not a 
difficulty in principle. Yet it was quite another thing for the Realists to 
then go on to show that the formal legal materials did not determine a 
result in those cases because they could not; that in those situations the law 
inevitably runs out. This was the principled objection the Realists were 
looking for—a principled indeterminacy.103 And what a judge like 
Cardozo and an avowed Realist like Llewellyn had helped to show was its 
source: the rival conceptual models built into the very framework of 
ordinary legal thinking, throughout the common law and even statutory 
and constitutional contexts.
104
  
For rationalist legal science, this was as close as it could get to outright 
refutation. This principled indeterminacy pointed up the futility in 
Langdell’s thinking that the law would, in point of fact, formally and 
uniquely determine an answer to every legal question. It had also exposed 
this stronger indeterminacy by exploding the assumptions that made that 
belief credible in the first place—the rationalist assumptions that the law 
was even intelligible as a conceptually absolute system that could be 
known by a categorically rational method. Descriptively, this was simply 
not how legal concepts worked. On the contrary, as exemplified by 
Cardozo’s analysis in Jacob & Youngs, from one situation-type to the next 
 
 
 101. George Lakoff has discussed in some depth the various ways that rival models produce these 
effects. See generally George Lakoff, Cognitive Models and Prototype Theory, CONCEPTS 391 (Eric 
Margolis and Stephen Laurence eds. 1999). 
 102. What I have called a principled indeterminacy is one way of spelling out a point heavily 
underlined by the pioneers of Critical Legal Studies. See generally Altman, supra note 81. 
 103. This way of presenting this critical side of Realism—as a conflict over rival doctrinal 
models—is hardly new, though it does add an analytical, explanatory layer over the now fairly 
standard account. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. 649, 651 (1984) (noting that the “Realists demonstrated that such [legal] principles were always 
contradictory, that for every principle there existed a potential counter principle”).  
 104. Karl Llewellyn famously made the same point in the statutory context. See Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes 
Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). 
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one could in fact justify multiple, conflicting rules because one could no 
less justifiably systematize the implied condition of performance—the 
concept of ‘performance’—under the sale-of-goods model as under the 
unique-performance model. The law could support not a single conceptual 
systematization as the rationalist legal scientists had presumed, but many. 
These competing models drew their substance, moreover, directly from the 
logic of the situations from which they emerged, situations that differed 
systematically and so conflicted in fact. To believe, as the rationalists did, 
that one could nevertheless appeal from these conflicting situations to the 
tribunal of a universal conceptual system, which would then render final 
judgment either by reconciling them both to some absolutely ‘correct’ type 
or by selecting one as ‘true’—was to simply close one’s eyes and dream 
away the facts of our conceptual life, the way we really live with and use 
and make concepts.
105
 Just as elsewhere in our conceptual lives, there was 
not one but always potentially many ways to model the general doctrines 
of our law: as many models as the novel situation inspires in the attentive 
lawyer. To insist otherwise, as Holmes had pointedly said of Langdell, 
would be to make a theological necessity out of the accidents of history.
106
 
This was a conceptual Realism,
107
 in short, and it took on Langdell’s 
science where it was most vulnerable—in the absolutism of its 
assumptions as to the law’s content and methodology. The truth of this 
indeterminacy told the falsity of that absolutism, his rationalism.  
Of course Langdell could always have made the reply imagined before, 
that he could systematize the doctrine here by simply assimilating every 
case to the perfect tender rule (and, implicitly, the sale-of-goods model 
that made sense of it). That assimilation he might then justify by pointing 
to the formal values it would serve—presumably, the enhanced 
administrability and ex ante certainty that comes with formal simplicity. 
But note that the argument would then have shifted ground. There would 
no longer even be the pretense of a formal, rational compulsion guiding 
this simplifying absolutism, no uniquely categorical justification of a 
single system of legal concepts and principles. Indeed, as Holmes saw all 
 
 
 105. In the philosophical literature, essentially the same point is made in terms of a definitional 
theory of concepts, which has undergone extensive criticism since W.V.O. Quine attacked it through 
his famous critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction. See generally Eric Margolis and Stephen 
Laurence, Concepts and Cognitive Science, CONCEPTS 1, 8–27 (Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence 
eds. 1999). 
 106. Book Notices, supra note 2. 
 107. I take it that this would also capture the gist of Legal Realism as Leiter understands it. See 
Leiter, supra note 12, at 112. The relation between Leiter’s Legal Realism and the one I sketch above 
is close, and I have drawn considerably on his illuminating account of that movement here.  
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too clearly in the first stirrings of Langdell’s science, what we instead 
behold is a mere “striving” after a “logical integrity” that is not there in 
the law in any actual sense, and certainly not in the sense Langdell had 
advertised in his famous preface. If there was ever a formally and 
conceptually absolute system behind the American common law, it was 
one that Langdell and his fellow scientists would have needed to put there, 
for reasons that might be sensible, surely idiosyncratic, and even, in its 
own ways, heroic,
108
 but none of them rationally compulsory. Langdell 
could have salvaged his science only by eviscerating it. And this made for 
the lasting critical lesson that Legal Realism left for the idea of a science 
of law. Whatever else that science was, it could not be the absolutist 
system that Langdell and the Scholastic Jurists before him had assumed it 
to be. A rationalist legal science simply could not be made to work.  
B. Another Realism, Another Legal Science 
What I have surveyed so far has been the history of an idea whose time 
many believe has come and gone. In the heyday of Legal Realism it would 
surely have been thought worse than wishful thinking, even a little quaint, 
to keep toiling on in the belief that there was something left in the 
traditional idea of legal science, let alone something worth resurrecting.
109
 
In the decades since Legal Realism passed from being a loose but lively 
movement of jurisprudential heretics into a virtual platitude among 
lawyers and legal scholars, there have been occasional stirrings in the 
direction of reviving a legal science, especially in the flanking schools of 
Critical Legal Studies (to the left) and Law and Economics (on the 
right).
110
 But by nearly all accounts, a legal science, in Langdell’s sense or 
in any other, would seem to have passed from the scene for good. 
In many ways, not least philosophically, we are still living with the 
uncertainty and intellectual fragmentation that only naturally followed its 
dissolution as a viable organizing idea and ideal for the law.
111
 It was no 
 
 
 108. See infra note 146. 
 109. In fact, some of the Realists did hope to build a new science of law, but none believed that it 
would bear much resemblance to the legal science conceived by Langdell and urged on by his 
followers. See, e.g., Herman Oliphant and Abram Hewitt, Introduction, in FROM THE PHYSICAL TO 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES ix (1929) (noting that “there is now no such thing as a science of law unless one 
is willing grossly to abuse the word ‘science’”).  
 110. See Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
335, 337–339 (1988) (discussing the “scientific” reaction to the challenge raised by Realism against 
adjudicative determinacy). 
 111. See WIECEK, supra note 5, at 16 (noting that, since the collapse of the “comprehensive 
structure of thought” that Langdell helped shape, “much of the [Supreme] Court’s work today remains 
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accident, after all, that Langdell’s science arose in an age hungering for a 
model of law that could answer the challenges of a rapidly industrializing, 
suddenly urban society, any more than it was mere coincidence that the 
first legal science emerged in a period when the Western Church was 
struggling to assert the independence of its clergy from the authority of the 
secular figures who had long dominated it.
112
 Whatever else the scientists 
themselves may have said, their legal sciences were always at least in 
some measure justified by the practical fruits they bore for the culture and 
institutions they would help create and sustain. A science of law always 
was as much the solution to a social need as it was the answer to a 
philosophical question. And much the same need persists today.
113
  
If this point sounds strangely Realist, echoing more Cardozo than 
canonist, it is because it is, and at one time was. In the same years as 
Realists like Llewellyn and Jerome Frank were still toying with 
jurisprudential formulas that more sophisticated Realists today can only 
look on with a mixture of exasperation and regret,
114
 another of the leading 
philosophical figures associated with Realism—John Dewey—was 
beginning to work out an approach to the law, only naturally from a 
philosophical angle, that would make it at once fully subservient to the 
social needs Holmes saw as its moving force and a coherent, integrated, 
and relatively autonomous body of abstract knowledge. What Dewey was 
working toward, in sympathy if not quite in tandem with the Realists, was 
his own legal science.
115
 In the pages left here I lay out what I take that 
science to involve, and where I think it differs from the rationalist tradition 
of legal science Dewey opposed and why it founders on none of the 
rationalist’s mistakes. I also hope to make clearer, even if only 
schematically, what work remains to be done in order to make that science 
viable today.  
 
 
vulnerable to challenges to its legitimacy”); Cook, supra note 4 (discussing the “void” left by the 
collapse of what I have called rationalist legal science). 
 112. See BERMAN, supra note 9, at 520–521. 
 113. See WIECEK, supra note 5 (noting that American law has still not moved beyond the collapse 
of classical legal thought). 
 114. See Leiter, supra note 74, at 15 (noting the regrettable “Frankification” of American Legal 
Realism by later commentators, and the resulting confusion of their philosophically respectable, core 
theses); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLEBUSH 5 (2008) (claiming that “[w]hat these officials do 
about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself”). 
 115. Dewey had made some contacts among legal scholars while a professor at Columbia 
University, where in the 1920s he gave a course in the law school entitled “Logical and Ethical 
Problems of the Law” that was reportedly attended by a number of law professors. See Edwin W. 
Patterson, Dewey’s Theories of Legal Reasoning and Valuation, in JOHN DEWEY: PHILOSOPHER OF 
SCIENCE AND FREEDOM 118, 119–120 (Sidney Hook ed.) (1950). 
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1. From Absolutizing to Naturalizing Legal Science 
If the lawyers who gave us the idea and tradition of Western legal 
science were clearly no philosophers, the philosopher who sought to 
revive that idea early in the last century was just as clearly no lawyer. In 
fact, although the law and legal subjects occur repeatedly and prominently 
in his writings, Dewey himself never set down anything resembling a legal 
philosophy proper, or even a full work on law. What he did have, and what 
he gave abbreviated expression to in several places, was a point of view on 
the law, a way of approaching jurisprudential questions that rested on 
fundamentally the same basis as the Realists’ views. For him, that basis 
would go by the name of naturalism. And one can begin to see its 
emerging outlines in the words of the lawyer he most admired, about the 
rationalist science both would decisively reject. 
In the passage that we saw earlier from Holmes’ critique of Langdell’s 
science, there were two leading thoughts on display.
116
 There was first of 
all, and perhaps most famously, the negative thought that would harden 
into the two indeterminacy theses, practical and principled, that later 
galvanized the Realists and solidified them into a reasonably coherent 
jurisprudential movement. But there was also a more positive thought 
evident there, dimly expressed though it was, that Holmes sought to 
relieve against the benighted backdrop of Langdell’s legal theology—a 
constructive proposal mingling with a diagnosis. As he hinted in contrast 
to Langdell’s taking at face value the outwardly logical appearance of 
legal thought, what mattered instead was the “man underneath,” the show 
of formality, the “history and nature of human needs” bubbling up all 
around the edges and through the cracks of its dialectical and 
demonstrative argumentation. What Langdell had overlooked in his haste 
to make a science out of law was the way he was approaching that science, 
how law should be thought of and studied as a social phenomenon. “As a 
branch of anthropology, law is an object of science,” as Holmes went on to 
say, but this meant that “the effort to reduce the concrete details of an 
existing system to the merely logical consequence of simple postulates is 
always in danger of becoming unscientific, and of leading to a 
misapprehension of the nature of the problem and the data.”117  
There were thus two senses of science that Holmes was invoking in his 
critique of Langdell. The first was the sense in which law itself could be 
 
 
 116. See supra note 78. 
 117. Book Notices, supra note 2. 
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thought of as a science—as in the working formula I have followed 
Berman in suggesting here, that would see law as an organized body of 
abstract knowledge (the intellectual premise) supported by a culture 
valuing objective research (the cultural premise) and institutions making 
that research possible (the institutional premise). There is little evidence 
that Holmes had any objection to regarding law as a science in this sense 
at all, in any of its three premises. As he says near the end of his review of 
Langdell’s casebook, and as he repeated elsewhere, there was indeed great 
value in having faculties devoted to working out the law’s postulates as a 
body of abstract knowledge, which could then be imparted to students as 
one, however “arbitrary,” way of understanding how the law “hangs 
together.”118 There was something essential, Holmes conceded, and 
essentially right, in taking the law as at least in part a conceptually 
coherent system, as something more than just “a rag-bag of details.” Like 
many lawyers of his day, including Langdell of course, Holmes seems to 
have had little trouble identifying law as scientific in this more 
fundamental sense. 
In another sense, however, Holmes was clearly signaling his departure 
from the way Langdell had understood that science. Their difference came 
down to how they would approach an understanding of that science: in 
effect, how they thought a philosophy of that science of law should work. 
As we saw in his analysis of that science’s intellectual premise, Langdell 
supposed that understanding the law as a science meant that one would be 
engaged in an effectively conceptual and logical enterprise: a logical 
analysis of the postulates of the law that would be dominated by the 
analytic and a priori (the conceptual absolutes), whose principal 
intellectual work was to articulate a method of justifying the specific 
absolutes postulated there (a theory of categorical legal rationality). This 
was what Holmes found “unscientific” in Langdell’s theory, what had 
given Langdell over to a pseudo-Hegelianism. Where Holmes thought the 
law would instead “fin[d] its philosophy [was] not in self-consistency,” 
not in any a priori logical analysis at all, but in history and 
anthropology.
119
 One should study the science of law as one would any 
human phenomenon, Holmes was saying—empirically, scientifically, or 
as we would say today, naturalistically.
120
 The law, considered as a science 
 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Book Notices, supra note 2. 
 120. Ronald Giere has recently given a sense of naturalism—what he calls a methodological 
naturalism—that Dewey would likely have found congenial. See GIERE, supra note 17, at 69–83, 151–
173. 
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in its more fundamental sense, was no less amenable to scientific 
observation and analysis as any other natural phenomenon. Law is 
fundamentally human, after all. And as the “great anthropological 
document” that it always was,121 the law demanded a philosophical lens 
that would not distort away all the conceptual imperfections and logical 
deformities that grew from its messy natural history. The science of law 
needed to be naturalized. 
Some decades later, when thinking through the implications of his 
logical theory for legal thought, Dewey had come to much the same 
diagnosis, and arrived at essentially the same approach. As to the latter, he 
was among the first American philosophers to call himself a naturalist, and 
had done so in the same years as he was beginning to work out his general 
approach to law.
122
 Thus, in perhaps his most famous piece on the law 
proper, he began where Holmes had left off nearly forty years earlier: in an 
analysis of “human conduct.”123 And a number of years later, in his only 
piece laying out his own “philosophy of law,” he remarked that his 
“standpoint” had led him to look on law as “through and through a social 
phenomenon: social in origin, in purpose or end, and in application.”124 
Understanding law thus required an analysis of “human activities,125 
natural facts that are clearly susceptible to study and examination in an 
anthropological and psychological vein—from the point of view of the 
natural and social sciences. His views on law were as thoroughly 
naturalistic as was his philosophy generally.
126
  
Yet the way that Dewey had begun to work out that naturalistic 
approach to law—incompletely, by his own admission—took a somewhat 
different direction from Holmes’, as Dewey also saw.127 That turn in his 
thinking away from Holmes had come chiefly from a preoccupation with 
 
 
 121. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 444 
(1899). 
 122. His most famous exposition of his naturalism occurs in Experience and Nature, published 
only a year after his most famous article on law “Logical Method and Law” appeared in The 
Philosophical Review. See JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER 
WORKS, 1925–1953 (1925). 
 123. John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 33 PHIL. REV. 560 (1924). 
 124. John Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953 115, 
117 (2008). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Leiter has similarly thought of this as the hallmark of a naturalized jurisprudence. See Leiter, 
supra note 74, at 40 (noting that “Jurisprudence . . . is ‘naturalized’ because it falls into place . . . as a 
chapter of psychology (or anthropology or sociology)”). 
 127. See John Dewey, Justice Holmes and the Liberal Mind, 3 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 
1925-1952 177, 182 (2008) (contrastively noting the “realistic strain” in Holmes’ thinking that led him 
to his externalist, prediction theory of law).  
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logical theory and the philosophy of language and psychology that 
Holmes, as a lawyer, did not share.
128
 But it had also come from the 
sharpened diagnosis of the failures of Langdell’s science that had 
accompanied the Legal Realism rising in those years. Holmes himself had 
taken as one of the lessons of Langdell’s failures that the law could be 
thought of as a science (and understood scientifically), but only by 
effectively dissolving “in cynical acid” the point of view that had given 
rise to that science in the first place: Langdell’s strictly internal point of 
view within and toward his science of law. Holmes instead abandoned 
altogether that internal point of view toward law—under which one takes 
certain materials in one’s thinking as authoritative—and replaced it with a 
purely external point of view (and, hence, the predictive theory of law he 
infamously advocated some years later).
129
 Holmes, as naturalist, would 
thus have salvaged a science of law by excising from it the internal 
viewpoint entirely: by letting the purely legal point of view fall away.  
Dewey, however, was never tempted by this externalist assumption 
about the law’s viewpoint, and rightly not.130 His concern was instead to 
find a way of making sense of the obviously internal point of view lawyers 
take in their reasoning with legal materials, yet without succumbing to the 
“delusive exactness” that he and Holmes had scorned in Langdell’s 
science.
131
 He had sought a way of preserving a broadly scientific concern 
for evolving a “logical systemization with a view to the utmost of 
generality and consistency”132 without lapsing into the rationalist belief 
that this meant “fixing a concept by assigning a single definite meaning, 
which is then developed by formal logic.”133 He would have kept alive the 
hopes of a legal science that would preserve, to some degree, the same 
conceptual systematizing and formal development of the law that Langdell 
had explored, all from a similarly internal point of view. But he would also 
have done so in a way that respected “[t]he judgment, the choice, which 
lies behind the logical form,” the twofold indeterminacy that Realists like 
Llewellyn and Cardozo had shown lurking along the margins of the law. 
 
 
 128. JOHN DEWEY, 12 LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY, JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 
1925-1952 537 (2008) (referring to logic as his “first and last love”); see also JOHN DEWEY, STUDIES 
IN LOGICAL THEORY (1903). 
 129. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991 (1997). 
 130. See Brian Leiter, Postscript to Part II: Science and Methodology in Legal Theory, in 
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 183, 188–91 (discussing the naturalist appropriation of Hart’s 
argument for the internal point of view). 
 131. Dewey, supra note 127, at 180. 
 132. Dewey, supra note 123, at 562. 
 133. Dewey, supra note 127, at 180.  
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Dewey, too, wanted to naturalize the science of law, then, but his 
naturalism had led him to a different picture of what the intellectual 
content of that science was—away from the rationalism of traditional legal 
science and towards another destination entirely. His science was to be as 
conceptually and formally rich as Langdell’s, yet vulnerable to none of 
criticisms that had made the latter’s conceptualism or formalism 
empirically untenable. It was to have the intellectual heft of a relatively 
autonomous discipline, while being no less useful for the working 
attorney. And he wanted to do all this without assuming any of the 
absolutes that had doomed Langdell’s science to a fanciful piety, an 
impossible dream. What he sought, but never gave, was naturalistic proof 
of the possibility of a pragmatic legal science.   
2. Toward a Pragmatic Legal Science  
Just what this naturalized legal science would have come to in Dewey’s 
hand and how he would have defended it are, like any counterfactual of 
history, impossible to know with any certainty. More to the point, and 
taking Dewey at his own word, they are largely beside the point.
134
 What 
Dewey left us was something immeasurably more valuable than any 
detailed roster of theses or intricately elaborated philosophical system. He 
left us a point of view; a line of thinking clear enough in its direction to 
amount to a viable working program. What that working program comes 
to, as is clear by now, is a new kind of a science of law: a pragmatic legal 
science. And that program takes as its basic framework of assumptions the 
same legal science that the Realists and their sympathizers, like Dewey 
himself, had hoped to fully and finally dislodge from the center of the 
intellectual tradition of our law nearly a century ago: the rationalist 
tradition of legal science. Below I therefore lay out how I believe those 
revised assumptions—as to the law’s content, methodology, and 
viewpoint—should be understood from Dewey’s point of view, and why 
their restoration in our law is so vital today. 
a. The Content Assumption: Conceptual Experimentalism 
As a naturalist in his philosophy of legal science, Dewey believed one 
could and should approach a study of the law in a way that comported 
with the best empirical account not only of how lawyers think when 
 
 
 134. See John Dewey, Nature in Experience, 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1952 
140, 140–41 (2008) (alluding to his “definite point of view” informing his philosophy).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
262 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 9:219 
 
 
 
 
thinking about law, as the Realists also believed,
135
 but of what they are 
thinking about. What he believed Realists like Cardozo and Holmes had 
shown through the argument for principled indeterminacy was that 
lawyers were thinking not along the lines of any absolute system of legal 
principles and concepts, but of multiple, conflicting doctrinal models—
different idealized conceptualizations of the same formal legal materials. 
For Dewey, this insight had not only formed the core of his logical theory, 
through a pragmatist theory of concepts,
136
 but it had also laid the basis of 
a larger normative project that he called conceptual reconstruction.
137
 Its 
upshot for legal science was nevertheless more general: whatever the 
ultimate account one can and should give of these doctrinal models, they 
were far from absolutes. These models are always merely hypothetical, 
held only contingently—and in this sense, experimental. Moreover, like in 
other contexts in our conceptual lives, rival models can and do subsist side 
by side. Even if one ultimately has to say which model to apply in one 
case, or which to make more or less central to a given concept as a part of 
systematizing an area of law, there is always a choice to be made in 
situations like these, as Cardozo had owned up to in Jacob & Youngs.
138
 
As these conceptual models thus come to replace conceptual absolutes, a 
conceptual absolutism gives way to what we might call a conceptual 
experimentalism. 
b. The Methodological Assumption: Instrumental Rationality 
The way that lawyers and judges make their decisions—the way they 
decide not only which model to apply but what models there are—also 
differs radically from the way that a rationalist like Langdell thought of it. 
Just as Dewey rejected as mere falsehood the belief in a single complete, 
comprehensive, and consistent set of legal principles and concepts that 
defined the law’s content, he also jettisoned the accompanying belief in a 
method that would categorically justify any such a system. He, along with 
Holmes, instead insisted that what justified the selection of a particular 
model in some case, or the development of a new model for a range of 
 
 
 135. See Leiter, supra note 74, at 39–46 (discussing the Realists’ naturalized approach to a theory 
of adjudication). 
 136. See Dewey, LOGIC, supra note 128; see also Jady Hsin, Laws, Demands, and Dispositions: 
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later cases, were the consequences that flowed from its adoption or 
creation. Models would thus be justified instrumentally, not categorically, 
tested by their value in solving social problems and answering social 
needs, not merely by the extent to which they cohered with an arbitrarily 
privileged set of legal postulates. In this legal science, an instrumental 
rationality replaces the categorical rationality of the rationalist tradition, 
and an unworkably absolutist methodology surrenders to a practicable 
scheme of empirical investigation and test by consequences—a 
methodological experimentalism. 
c.  The Viewpoint Assumption: A Pluralist Internalism 
Once we leave behind these two prior absolutist assumptions, we can 
see that the naturalist commitment to preserving the internal point of view 
toward law also has to undergo yet another, and final, transformation from 
the rationalist tradition. As we saw earlier, the absolutist way that that 
tradition understood the prior assumptions fed back into and transformed 
the internal point of view that it took for granted: not only was the law’s 
point of view internal but it was also absolutely autonomous. This was the 
case because the body of knowledge that the rationalist assumed as the 
law’s content, and the method by which the rationalist legal science could 
come to know it, required only a knowledge of the formal legal materials 
themselves: disciplinary outsiders could no more presume to teach a 
lawyer law than a lawyer could presume to teach a chemist chemistry.  
Having witnessed the collapse of the rationalist’s absolutism as to the 
law’s content and methodology, however, we must also come to recognize 
how much less absolute that autonomy must be. Not only can other 
disciplines —across the social and even natural sciences, from economics 
and sociology to epidemiology and environmental sciences—help lawyers 
understand the consequences that their choice of models will likely have in 
answering social needs; they can also aid in framing and developing the 
postulates of new models: disciplines like philosophy and political science 
especially, and the humanities more broadly, all can and do contribute to 
framing the conceptual raw materials that go into the many, various, and 
changing models composing our law. Yet this is far from conceding away 
all of law’s autonomy, as if welcoming in the insights of another discipline 
were to deny that lawyers had any of their own.
139
 On the contrary, as 
Dewey made sure to point out,
140
 it is up to lawyers, and lawyers alone, to 
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build the final models that go into our law, and to draw out their 
consequences for the workaday minutiae of the practicing attorney and the 
presiding judge. It is lawyers, after all, who in our society build the 
bridges from formal legal schemes to principled models to practicable 
rules of law. The premises of our law may not be entrusted exclusively to 
lawyers’ concern, but their legal implications should be and largely are.  
In their moments of theoretical repose lawyers thus are, or at least 
could be, more and less than they have been thought—more than the social 
janitors that Judge Posner sees, but also less than the priests of Langdell’s 
legal seminary, divining a mythical law beyond the cases.
141
 One could 
instead call them our social architects though that, too, risks some 
exaggeration, particularly now that so many of the law’s blueprints are the 
work of legislators, not all of whom are lawyers or, when they are, 
particularly learned ones at that. More fitting then may be the title of social 
coder, authors of the apps for a social world endlessly in the midst of 
technical and fashionable upgrades—the evolving source code of a Legal 
Science 2.0.
142
 Whatever the image, the lesson is clear enough. Even if the 
broad outlines of the legal vision for our society may not be entirely or 
even mainly of lawyers’ imagining, its blueprints, the lines of code, are. 
This is enough for law to enjoy a relative intellectual autonomy,
143
 unified 
by its own point of view—by its pluralist internalism. 
CONCLUSION 
The century since Langdell’s legal science began its steady descent into 
obsolescence tells the tale of our disenchantment with law. Today, perhaps 
more than ever before in our history, Americans have come to distrust not 
just the policies and personages of a Congress or an administration, but the 
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very rule of our law.
144
 Politicians may still pay their lip-service and we 
may still dutifully nod along, but for many Americans the rule of law has 
never felt more elusive, less real, than it does today. Although this 
complex phenomenon naturally has many causes, one powerful force of 
disintegration has come from within law itself: from the “fragmenting 
jurisprudence” of the last half century,145 which has corroded away the 
belief, first among lawyers and consequently among others, in a 
distinctively legal aim or intellectual method—in the legal point of 
view.
146
 Many lawyers, disillusioned with the centuries-old belief that law 
could be made rational, have now given up on making it even seem 
reasonable. And as law has come instead to be seen as the expression of 
colliding interests or raw political will or just the dictate of the deep-
pocketed, our fellow citizens have begun to give up on law, too. 
Just under a century ago, as the world looked on in horror at the vast 
carnage of its first modern war, Dewey could also feel the same forces of 
disintegration, of disbelief in the power of ideas to rule social life, acidly 
coursing through public opinion.
147
 And like the generation of legal 
scholars before him who came of age in the shadow of a savage civil war, 
he too saw the need to restore the public’s faith in “intelligence and ideas 
. . . as the supreme force in the settlement of social issues”—its faith in 
law as a rational system of justice.
148
 Like his legal idol Holmes, however, 
he had no illusions about what that system—what Langdell had so 
triumphantly called a science of law—could realistically do, or what it had 
to be.  
As this Article has explained, it simply could not be the absolute 
system of rules and principles that lawyers like Langdell or jurists like the 
twelfth-century canonists dreamed it was. So long as “life is still going on, 
it is still an experiment,”149 the rationalist faith in a system of law frozen in 
time, absolutized into a bloodless and impractical conceptual perfection, 
was an obstacle, not a help, to resolving social conflict—a formula of 
repose, not a postulate for living. To their great credit, the Realists helped 
us to see why that was. And yet, after the rationalist idols finally came 
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crashing down, they also offered precious little help in picking up the 
pieces.  
As this Article has also argued, even as the mainstream of the legal 
tradition began to fray after the Realists themselves had come and gone, 
another tradition—the far older counter-tradition of legal science—quietly 
lived on. While other Realists were lunging down their jurisprudential 
dead-ends, philosophers like John Dewey and even some of the foremost 
Legal Realists like Walter Wheeler Cook were busy rebuilding that 
tradition in the image of a very different conception of legal science—the 
pragmatic conception discussed in these pages. It is fair to say that that 
tradition, overwhelmed as it was by the misfortune of circumstance and 
shifting intellectual fashion, never got the hearing it deserved. But as this 
Article has shown, there is far more to that tradition of legal science, 
conceived in that experimentalist spirit, than our more cynical 
jurisprudents would care to admit. At the very least, that conception of 
legal science can escape the fate of its rationalist ancestors: we need not 
turn our back on the insights of the Realists to believe in the possibility of 
a legal science, at least of the pragmatic kind. Law can be a science in this 
sense, and in many ways it already is. In our present age of 
disenchantment, its full revival as a working postulate of our law—as an 
article of a new fighting faith—is not just long overdue, but sorely needed. 
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